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REASSESSING THE CITIZEN VIRTUES OF HOMEOWNERSHIP 
Stephanie M. Stern* 
The  assumption  that  homeownership  creates  more  politically  and 
civically engaged  citizens who  contribute  to  local  communities  (as well as 
national  democracy)  dominates  property  law.    This  belief  underlies 
influential  theories of property and  land use and  justifies housing policies 
promoting  homeownership  and  expanding  homeownership’s  reach.    This 
Essay  challenges  the  “citizenship  virtues” of homeownership and  contends 
that  the evidence reveals a  far more modest, and particularized, picture of 
citizenship  effects  than  commonly  assumed.    I  explore  psychological, 
historical, and economic  factors  that may underlie  the variable citizenship 
effects  from homeownership. Some of  these  factors elucidate not only why 
owners and tenants perform similarly in certain citizenship measures but, by 
the  same  token, why  it  is not universally  true  that  fear of  increased  rents 
constrains  local contribution by tenants.   I consider the  implications of this 
analysis for legal theory and note potential applications to housing policy. 
INTRODUCTION 
The assumption that homeowners are (much) better local citizens 
dominates property theory and legal scholarship, to date without serious 
critique.1  The claimed “citizenship effects” of homeownership comprise a 
constellation of positive externalities, including local contribution and 
investment, political participation, neighboring, and collective action, as 
* Associate Professor, Chicago-Kent College of Law.  I would like to thank Tim Iglesias, 
Larissa Katz, Gregory Alexander, Cherie Metcalf, Josh Melson, Tom Gaylord,  Beth Nielsen, 
Jonathan Nash,  the panelists and participants of the American Association of Law Schools 
National Property Conference (2010), the faculty of the Loyola Los Angeles School of Law, 
and the faculty of Queen’s College for their generous comments. 
1. See, e.g., A. Mechele Dickerson, The Myth of Home Ownership and Why Home
Ownership Is Not Always a Good Thing, 84 Ind. L.J. 189, 191–92 (2009) (“Home ownership 
is also thought to benefit the individual homeowner’s community since homeowners tend to 
be concerned, involved citizens who are more likely to participate in local civic 
organizations, who will lobby for long-term or high quality community services . . . .”); 
Geoffrey D. Korff, Reviving the Forgotten American Dream, 113 Penn St. L. Rev. 417, 440–41 
(2008) (noting despite homeownership’s financial risks, investment limitations, and 
mobility constraints, there are sociological and psychological benefits including greater 
political involvement and participation in local voluntary organizations and greater 
personal satisfaction); Roberta F. Mann, The (Not So) Little House on the Prairie:  The 
Hidden Costs of the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction, 32 Ariz. St. L.J. 1347, 1354–55 
(2000) (“This ‘homeowner activism’ creates a better community for all residents.  Arguably, 
homeowners are better citizens than renters, and thus wider home ownership creates 
economic and political stability.” (footnote omitted)).  
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well as gains to prosperity and stability from industrious and content 
citizens.2  There are two influential accounts of how homeownership 
produces this breadth of citizenship benefits.  In the first account, 
homeownership is morally and psychologically transformative.  
Ownership, and the act of becoming an owner, inculcate prosocial 
behavior and “citizenship virtue,” which generalizes across civic and social 
behavior.3  In the second account, the investment stake in the owned home 
(and by some accounts the high-risk, undiversified nature of that interest) 
motivate socially beneficial local participation and contribution.4  Under 
either view, if homeownership is good for society, and powerfully so, then 
shouldn’t ownership claim center stage in property law?  And shouldn’t 
government fund programs that expand homeownership’s reach? 
In contrast to the prevailing politico-legal accounts, the empirical 
evidence reveals a more modest and particularized picture of citizenship 
effects.  Rather than evincing global personal transformation, 
homeowners perform similarly or only modestly better than tenants of 
comparable residential duration in many domains, including most types of 
community organizational participation, neighboring behaviors, some 
forms of collective action, and local socializing.5  The homeownership 
transformation also does little to promote some of the expected citizen 
attributes or gains from increased social status as owners:  The evidence 
that homeownership increases life satisfaction and autonomy is 
equivocal.6 
2. For a review of the empirical literature, see William M. Rohe et al., The Social 
Benefits and Costs of Homeownership:  A Critical Assessment of the Research 11–22 
(Harvard Univ. Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies, Working Paper No. LIHO-01.12, 2001) 
[hereinafter Rohe et al., Social Benefits], available at 
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/homeownership/liho01-12.pdf (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review). 
3. See Lawrence J. Vale, The Ideological Origins of Affordable Homeownership Efforts, 
in Chasing the American Dream 15, 20 (William M. Rohe & Harry L. Watson eds., 2007) 
(describing claimed moral and citizenship effects of homeownership); cf. Eduardo M. 
Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 821, 879–81 (2009) (considering role of property 
ownership in promoting “virtue ethics” such as personal industry and flourishing). 
4. See, e.g., William A. Fischel, The Homevoter Hypothesis 4–12 (2001) (theorizing 
undiversified, high-risk home investment encourages socially beneficial behavior). 
5. See Denise DiPasquale & Edward L. Glaeser, Incentives and Social Capital:  Are 
Homeowners Better Citizens?, 45 J. Urb. Econ. 354, 374 (1999) (finding only modest renter-
owner differences when analysis controls for length of residence); see also William M. Rohe 
et al., The Social-Psychological Effects of Affordable Homeownership, in Chasing the 
American Dream, supra note 3, at 215, 231–32 [hereinafter Rohe et al., Social-Psychological] 
(finding that compared to renters, homeowners did not report higher self-esteem, more 
participation in voluntary organizations except neighborhood organizations, or greater 
leveraging of social networks).   
6. See Rohe et al., Social-Psychological, supra note 5, at 230–32 (finding home 
purchase by low-income buyers did not increase self-esteem and increased life satisfaction 
only among buyers who could afford repairs and maintenance).   
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The investment stake view of homeownership is similarly incomplete.  
Investment profit is a significant motive and presumably produces 
positive externalities, but the subset of investment-motivated behavior 
appears narrower than commonly assumed.  Many aspects of local 
behavior do not vary substantially between renters and owners, either 
because noneconomic forces are at play or because the investment model 
founders in the face of perceptual or informational deficits.  Housing and 
sociology studies have also failed to elicit a correlation between individual 
investment orientation and certain forms of local contribution and 
activism.7  In the legal scholarship, scholars have charged that the 
investment stake account underappreciates the strength of consumption 
value (i.e., the value of using local and property amenities) and social ties 
in promoting citizenship behavior, as well as the influence of residential 
composition, wealth, and associational preferences.8 
This Essay offers a behavior-specific and evidence-based examination 
of the alleged “citizen virtues” of homeownership for local behavior.  I 
draw from multiple, large-sample, national cross-sectional studies, region-
specific research, and a longitudinal study, all of which control for varying 
socio-economic and demographic variables.  What emerges from this 
evidence-based analysis is a more modest picture of homeownership’s 
local civic dividends and a puzzle of variable effects across subtypes of 
citizenship behavior.  There are minimal differences between owners and 
tenants on an array of social capital measures and citizenship attributes, 
including community-level, fraternal, and volunteer organizational 
participation, neighboring, local social ties and socializing, self-esteem, 
and life satisfaction.9  Where owners do make greater social contributions, 
7. See Kevin R. Cox, Housing Tenure and Neighborhood Activism, 18 Urb. Aff. Rev. 107, 
120 (1982) (finding negligible association between homeowner status, which implies 
investment orientation, and awareness of effect of local investment on home value); Rohe et 
al., Social Benefits, supra note 2, at 18 (reviewing research finding that investment 
orientation does not predict local and voluntary participation).   
8. See Lee Anne Fennell, Homes Rule, 112 Yale L.J. 617, 641–54, (2002) [hereinafter 
Fennell, Homes Rule] (reviewing Fischel, supra note 4) (discussing implications for 
homevoting of residential composition and associational preferences); Lee Anne Fennell & 
Julie A. Roin, Controlling Residential Stakes, 77 U. Chi. L. Rev. 143, 162 (2010) (noting 
homeowners’ consumption interests in community amenities); Peñalver, supra note 3, at 
834–40 (criticizing law and economics account for overemphasizing investment motives 
and neglecting role of use value in promoting prosocial, local behaviors). 
9. See, e.g., DiPasquale & Glaeser, supra note 5, at 355–57, 374–77 (finding only 
modest differences between owners and renters on social capital variables when controlling 
for tenure); William M. Rohe & Michael A. Stegman, The Impact of Home Ownership on the 
Social and Political Involvement of Low-Income People, 30 Urb. Aff. Rev. 152, 167 (1994) 
(finding effect of homeownership limited or even negative with respect to socializing and 
community participation); Peter H. Rossi & Eleanor Weber, The Social Benefits of 
Homeownership:  Empirical Evidence from National Surveys, 7 Housing Pol’y Debate 1, 29 
(1996) (analyzing national survey data and finding “[o]n the bulk of the questions . . . 
owners and renters did not differ”). 
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length of residence, rather than ownership per se, appears to mediate 
many of the effects.10  There are, however, positive effects of 
homeownership for voting, certain forms of local collective action, and 
private property upkeep and improvement.11 
This pattern of citizenship effects counsels more modest expectations 
for homeownership’s local civic virtues.  The data indicate that neither the 
transformation nor investment stake theory are entirely correct—and 
suggest that no unitary, single-root cause theory is likely to fit the pattern 
of findings.  To the contrary, different civic behaviors likely emerge from 
different motivations and individual behaviors may have multiple causes. 
And, while this paper focuses the relationship between property tenure 
and citizenship, it is of course possible, and even probable, that 
community, culture, or other social forces are more powerful prisms for 
local civic behavior than ownership.   
In this paper, I delineate psychological, historical, and economic 
factors that may explain the pattern of parities and disparities between 
renters and owners.  Some of these factors suggest not only why owners 
and tenants perform similarly on certain citizenship measures but, by the 
same token, why it is not universally true that fear of increased rents 
constrains tenant support for local investment.  Admittedly, this 
multidisciplinary approach at times lacks specificity.  For some behaviors, 
it is difficult to disentangle which factors are producing (or stifling) 
citizenship effects.  Because this approach more accurately represents the 
competing motivations and forces affecting local behavior, however, it 
facilitates future empirical investigation of the comparative contributions 
of different factors.  A multidisciplinary, behavior-specific analysis also 
suggests potential remedies to citizenship deficits from declining 
homeownership rates, unstable homeownership, or other causes (and 
suggests that in many cases these remedies may themselves need to be 
multifaceted in order to address different barriers to local contribution). 
This analysis has implications not only for legal theory, but also for 
policies privileging homeownership.  The United States has long promoted 
homeownership through a host of incentives and protections: 
nontaxation of imputed rent, property tax deductions, the home mortgage 
interest tax deduction, favored capital gains treatment, the nonregulation 
of lax underwriting, and, most recently, foreclosure relief.12  A variety of 
10. See DiPasquale & Glaeser, supra note 5, at 356 (analyzing role of residential 
duration in homeownership effects). 
11. See DiPasquale & Glaeser, supra note 5, at 374 (finding owners are more likely to
vote).  See generally Fischel, supra note 4, at 129–206 (presenting case studies examining 
how homeownership promotes community investment through desire to protect property 
value).   
12. Of these, the nontaxation of imputed rent is by far the largest and most direct 
government incentive.  See Richard Goode, Imputed Rent of Owner-Occupied Dwellings 
Under the Income Tax, 15 J. Fin. 504, 508–09 (1960) (estimating yield from taxing imputed 
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programs also seek to extend homeownership to moderate- and low-
income buyers through Federal Housing Administration (FHA) loan 
assistance, first-time buyer tax credits, subsidized loans via the federal 
HOME program, and federally funded state and nonprofit affordable 
homeownership programs.13  Another housing market distortion, less 
recognized in the legal literature but widely acknowledged in economics 
research, is that many tax incentives operate primarily on consumption 
rather than homeownership rate (i.e., subsidized homebuyers purchase 
larger and more expensive housing).14 
Incentives and legal protections result in more owner-occupied 
housing than would otherwise be supplied by the market and exert 
upward pressure on both homeownership rates and housing 
consumption.15  Of course, federal subsidies are not the exclusive driver of 
homeownership rates.  Advances in transportation, preferences for single-
family houses, the durability of owned single-family housing stock, and 
net rent).  For other incentives, such as lending standards and government homebuying 
assistance, the federal government has worked in concert with private industry.  See, e.g., 
Office of Policy Dev. & Research, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., Urb. Pol’y Brief No. 2, 
Homeownership and Its Benefits (1995) [hereinafter Urban Policy Brief], at 
http://www.huduser.org/publications/txt/hdbrf2.txt (on file with the Columbia  Law 
Review) (describing President Clinton’s National Homeownership Strategy to “increase 
ownership opportunities among populations and communities with lower than average 
homeownership rates”).  In addition to federal programs, many states provide special 
protections to homeowners.  State homestead exemptions exempt some or all of the equity 
in a personal residence from creditors.  See Ryan P. Rivera, State Homestead Exemptions 
and Their Effect on Federal Bankruptcy Laws, 39 Real. Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 71, 77–91 (2004) 
(reviewing current and historical applications of several state homestead exemptions).  
Many states also have tenancy-by-the-entirety ownership, which shields the family 
residence and other marital property from the creditors of one spouse.  See John V. Orth, 
Tenancy by the Entirety:  The Strange Career of the Common-Law Marital Estate, 1997 BYU 
L. Rev. 35, 48 (“In many states, land may be protected to an unlimited extent from the 
creditors of either tenant by the entirety . . . .”). 
13. See J. Michael Collins, Federal Policies Promoting Affordable Homeownership, in 
Chasing the American Dream, supra note 3, at 69, 78–95 (reviewing various federal 
initiatives to increase homeownership rate).  In addition, the Community Reinvestment Act 
obligates banks to meet the needs of borrowers in their market, including borrowers in low-
income neighborhoods (though this legislation has had a mixed record of success).  See 
Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901–2908 (2006) (mandating action by 
banks to “meet the credit needs of the local communities in which they are chartered”). 
14. See Steven C. Bourassa & William G. Grigsby, Income Tax Concessions for Owner-
Occupied Housing, 11 Housing Pol’y Debate 521, 536–37 (2000) (concluding based on 
review of housing economics research that subsidies are imperfectly capitalized into home 
prices and thus result in excessive housing consumption).   
15. Economists dispute the degree of these effects, but a consensus agree that federal 
policies, particularly the nontaxation of imputed rent, increase homeownership rates.  See, 
e.g., Harvey S. Rosen, Housing Subsidies:  Effects on Housing Decisions, Efficiency, and 
Equity, in 1 Handbook of Public Economics 375, 395–96 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin S. 
Feldstein eds., 1985) (modeling effect of taxing imputed rent on homeownership rates and 
house values). 
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economic prosperity have all played important roles in increasing 
homeownership.16  As a result of both government intervention and 
sociodemographic change, homeownership has increased substantially in 
the past half-century from 55% in 1950 to an all-time high of 69.1% in the 
first quarter of 2005.17  The increase has been especially dramatic in 
recent years for low-income homeowners, with low-income minority 
households representing 11% of the net increase in homeowners and 
home purchase loans to low-income families growing by 79%.18 
By providing ready justification for policies promoting 
homeownership, political commentary and legal theories of ownership’s 
civic virtue have supported government subsidy and fueled the arguments 
of housing industry and banking special interests.19  The belief in the 
social efficacy of ownership, and the cultural sway of the owned home, 
16. For a review of the economic, historical, and political forces influencing 
homeownership rates from the late nineteenth century to the present, see Vincent J. 
Cannato, A Home of One’s Own, Nat’l Aff., Spring 2010, at 69, 70–81.  In particular, 
transportation has played a strong role.  Personal transportation in the early 1900s opened 
the suburbs and provided a market for eager buyers of single-family homes.  See David L. 
Ames & Linda Flint McClelland, Dep’t of the Interior, Nat’l Reg. Bull., Historic Residential 
Suburbs:  Guidelines for Evaluation and Documentation for the National Register of Historic 
Places 21 (2002), available at 
http://www.nps.gov/history/nR/publications/bulletins/pdfs/Suburbs.pdf (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review) (“The rapid adoption of the mass-produced automobile by Americans 
led to the creation of the automobile-oriented suburb of single-family houses . . . .”).  
Moreover, once homeownership reached high levels, there were constraints on the 
responsiveness of homeownership rates to changed preferences for ownership or declining 
market conditions.  The durability of housing stock and “tastes for structure” mean that 
residents seeking single-family living arrangements find negligible rental stock of this kind.  
See Edward L. Glaeser & Jesse M. Shapiro, The Benefits of the Home Mortgage Interest 
Deduction, 17 Tax Pol’y & Econ. 37, 45 (2003) (noting “correlation between living in a 
single-family detached home (or mobile home) and owning” is 58% nationwide and 73% at 
the city level). 
17. U.S. Census Bureau, Historical Census of Housing Tables:  Homeownership Rates, at 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/census/historic/owner.html (last updated 
Dec. 2, 2004) (on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also U.S. Census Bureau, Housing 
Vacancies and Home Ownership, First Quarter 2008 tbl.5 (2008), at 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/qtr108/q108tab5.html (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review) (showing homeownership rates in United States from 1968 to 2008).  
The small but steady uptick in homeownership is particularly notable in light of the strong 
demographic trends of later marriage and childbearing plus greater investment in human 
capital via postsecondary education, all of which we would expect to exert downward 
pressure on the homeownership rate.   
18. See Anne B. Shlay, Low-Income Homeownership:  American Dream or Delusion?,
43 Urb. Stud. 511, 516 (2006) (citing studies examining period from 1993 to 2000). 
19. See, e.g., Mark Andrew Snider, The Suburban Advantage:  Are the Tax Benefits of 
Homeownership Defensible?, 32 N. Ky. L. Rev. 157, 175–76 (2005) (arguing benefits of 
homeownership justify tax subsidies); cf. Stephanie M. Stern, Residential Protectionism and 
the Legal Mythology of Home, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1093, 1095 nn.2 & 4–6 (2009) [hereinafter 
Stern, Residential Protectionism] (critiquing theories supporting legal protection of the 
home). 
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have encouraged large-scale subsidization of homebuying and buttressed 
ill-conceived policy initiatives to address housing downturns.20  In turn, 
government incentives have reinforced a level of public enthusiasm and 
corresponding social norms for traditional home ownership that, at least 
until recently, appear to accept no substitute.21  These sentiments have 
ensured broad political support for laws privileging homeownership, and 
created stumbling blocks for proposals for nontraditional ownership 
forms and ownership alternatives.22 
This Essay offers a critical reassessment of the local citizenship 
virtues of homeownership.  Part I describes the dominant legal and 
political theories of the citizenship externalities from homeownership.  
Too often, this commentary has either neglected the empirical research or 
worked backward, focusing myopically on specific positive findings 
(typically without considering effect size) and then improperly 
generalizing these findings to most or all local civic behavior.  Part II 
assesses the research on owner versus renter contributions to social 
capital, voting and local amenity investment, property upkeep, and 
citizenship character traits.  Part III critiques the prevailing theories of 
homeownership’s citizenship virtues and explores the disjunction 
between theory and empirical evidence.  In Part IV, I turn to the puzzle of 
disparate citizenship effects with an eye toward advancing the 
development of a more comprehensive, multivariate model of ownership 
effects.  Part V raises some potential implications of my analysis for the 
legal promotion of homeownership and the development of alternative 
residential tenure forms. 
I.  THE CITIZEN VIRTUES OF HOMEOWNERSHIP 
Political commentary and scholarly work extol the citizenship virtues 
of homeownership in expansive and celebratory terms.23  The accepted 
wisdom is that homeownership as a form of property tenure produces a 
20. See Vale, supra note 3, at 15–17 (“The high rate of homeownership in the United 
States . . . has been nurtured by generations of public policy, which were in turn preceded by 
concerted efforts to instill an ideologically grounded belief in the moral value of the owned 
home.”); see also supra notes 12–14 and accompanying text (discussing government 
subsidies). 
21. See Cannato, supra note 16, at 81–82 (describing turning tide in recent months 
with political and academic commentators, some in reversal of their prior positions, 
criticizing prevailing homeownership norm). 
22. See infra Part V.C (discussing how empirical research alleviates concerns about 
potential social harm from nontraditional homeownership and alternatives to 
homeownership).   
23. See, e.g., Henry E. Hoagland, The Relation of the Work of the Federal Home Loan 
Bank Board to Home Security and Betterment, 16 Proc. Acad. Pol. Sci. 317, 318 (1935) 
(“Governments encourage home ownership on the theory that the man who owns a home is 
a better citizen than one who does not.”).   
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breadth of positive local citizenship behaviors and that these effects are 
sizeable in magnitude.24  Presidential administrations from Hoover to 
Bush have framed the near universal promotion of homeownership as 
requisite to the health of communities and the nation.25  As early as 1923, 
one political representative summed up the sentiment:  “A homeowner is 
a . . . better and more useful citizen of the community in all respects . . . 
[a]nd our community welfare and future are rendered more secure in 
direct proportion to the increase in homeownership.”26  This belief has 
persisted, and flourished, to the present day.  Echoing his predecessors, 
former Housing and Urban Development Secretary Henry Cisneros 
recently stated:  “Expanding homeownership is vitally important to our 
country, because home ownership is critical . . . to the building of strong 
communities.”27  Of course, to the extent that both business and political 
interests gain from policies promoting homeownership, there will be a 
ready supply of theories to support homebuying.28  Yet, given the ubiquity 
24. See supra notes 1–2 (describing proponents of theories positing causal 
relationship between homeownership and positive citizenship behaviors).  But see Kristen 
David Adams, Homeownership:  American Dream or Illusion of Empowerment?, 60 S.C. L. 
Rev. 573, 577–85 (2009) (proving median American family cannot afford median American 
home); Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Exporting the Ownership Society:  A Case Study on the 
Economic Impact of Property Rights, 39 Rutgers L.J. 59, 77–87 (2007) (critiquing De Soto’s 
vision of role of property in generating individual wealth and small enterprise in light of 
predatory lending and other barriers to successful low-income homeownership in United 
States).   
25. As early as Hoover’s speech in 1931 at the Home Building and Homeownership 
Conference, presidents have concluded that the homeownership “aspiration . . . makes for 
better citizenship.”  Vale, supra note 3, at 32 (citing President Herbert Hoover, Address to 
the White House Conference on Home Building and Home Ownership (Dec. 2, 1931)).  For a 
more recent account of the benefits of “neighborliness” and “other individual and civic 
virtues” that accompany homeownership, see generally Urban Policy Brief, supra note 12.   
26. Home-Owning and Good Citizenship, 1 Tax Facts Published in the Interests of 
Sound Economics and American Ideals 41, 41 (1923), available at 
http://books.google.com/books/download/Tax_facts.pdf?id=-
xoLAQAAIAAJ&output=pdf&sig=ACfU3U0Tc7gnBlkak306vLyzOmCMMGKfRw (on file with 
the Columbia  Law  Review); see also Gary Cross, An All-Consuming Century:  Why 
Commercialism Won in Modern America 74 (2000) (describing widespread belief of 
political leaders in 1930s that “government encouragement of home ownership would 
create ‘good citizenship’”).   
27. Wiliam M. Rohe & Leslie S. Stewart, Homeownership and Neighborhood Stability, 7 
Housing Pol’y Debate 37, 38 (1996) (quoting Henry Cisneros).   
28. See, e.g., Dickerson, supra note 1, at 192 (“The strength of the housing markets is
often a bellwether for the general strength of the U.S. economy, and a weak housing market 
can create volatility across the spectrum of credit markets . . . . Building and selling homes 
helps increase jobs and boosts the demand for goods and services.”).  In particular, housing 
industry publications illustrate research bias.  For example, a 2006 research brief by the 
National Association of Realtors discussed at length the issues of selection bias and the 
substantial role of length of residence as opposed to tenure form, but nonetheless 
concluded that “public policy makers would be wise to consider the apparent immense 
social benefits of homeownership and stable housing.”  Nat’l Ass’n of Realtors, Social 
Benefits of Homeownership and Stable Housing 16 (2006), available at 
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of such claims among diverse interest groups (including conservatives, 
liberals, and even special interests who do not benefit from mortgage 
subsidies such as low-income interest groups), there also appears to be a 
strong current of genuine belief in the virtues of homeownership—a belief 
perhaps fundamentally rooted in the country’s founding and the historical 
conception of the independent, property-holding yeoman.29 
The citizenship virtue of homeownership is also an established tenet 
of academic scholarship, including legal scholarship.  Scholars have 
defended subsidies to homeowners based on the benefits to communities, 
neighborhood cohesiveness, and citizen involvement in community life.30  
Even articles criticizing the legal privileging of homeownership often 
endorse the view that homeownership broadly promotes prosocial 
behavior and well-functioning localism.31  Such accounts have flourished 
in the scholarship despite their failure to address the empirical research.32  
Even when scholarship does reference empirical research, it typically 
neglects effect size (i.e., how much citizenship behavior is produced rather 
than mere statistical significance) and overgeneralizes effects to spheres 
where ownership-driven externalities are unlikely.33 
The dominant politico-legal theories of homeownership’s citizenship 
effects can be grouped loosely into two categories:  first, ownership as 
personal transformation and second, the social incentives emanating from 
financial investment stake.  These two conceptions are not divergent in 
every instance:  Some writings on the personal transformation wrought by 
http://www.planning.org/conference/previous/2009/materials/pdf/S013_NAR_Social_Be
nefits_of_Stable_Housing.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).   
29. See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia 170–71 (Frank Shuffelton 
ed., Penguin Books 1999) (1785) (arguing husbandmen laboring on land ensures “republic 
in vigour” and promotes “permanence of government”); cf. Stanley Elkins & Eric McKitrick, 
The Age of Federalism 198 (1993) (describing mixed political reception of Jefferson’s 
proposals to distribute parcels of land to small farmers based on his belief in property-
holding yeoman as ideal citizen).   
30. See, e.g., Snider, supra note 19, at 175–76 (arguing individual and social benefits of 
homeownership justify tax subsidies).   
31. See sources cited supra note 1 (describing scholarship criticizing legal privileging
of the home but still assuming substantial social benefits of homeownership).   
32. See infra Parts I.A & I.B (describing dominant accounts of the social value of 
homeownership).   
33. See, e.g., Rachel D. Godsil & David V. Simunovich, Protecting Status:  The Mortgage
Crisis, Eminent Domain, and the Ethic of Homeownership, 77 Fordham L. Rev. 949, 973 
(2008) (“[I]t seems clear that homeowner status overall generates net positive outcomes for 
both families and communities.”); Korff, supra note 1, at 441 & n.146 (listing “often-cited 
sociological benefits of home ownership” but acknowledging “there is little supporting 
empirical evidence regarding some of home ownership’s stated advantages”); Snider, supra 
note 19, at 175–76 (asserting homeownership “increases stability, safety, and security for 
homeowners, allows taxpayers to live in higher quality residences, gives homeowner’s 
children access to better schools, and improves neighborhood cohesiveness” without 
examining extent of increase). 
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homeownership allude to investment stake and some investment stake 
scholarship explicitly or implicitly recognizes personal or moral 
dimensions of homeownership’s citizenship effects.34  However, when the 
accounts overlap, the central notions of ownership virtues embodied in 
each conception remain distinct—and are presumed valid. 
A.  Homeownership as Personal Transformation 
In many accounts, homeownership is personally and morally 
transformative with home purchase akin to a developmental milestone.  
As Edward Goetz has observed, “homebuying is seen as . . . changing not 
just one’s tenure but also a range of individual characteristics.”35  The 
owned home and the status it confers—as well as implicitly the 
mainstream, single-family life it usually entails—transforms individuals 
into citizens tied to their communities, engaged in local affairs, and willing 
to work cooperatively to solve collective dilemmas.  Correspondingly, 
tenancy may hinder personal development, either intrinsically or in the 
eyes of others.  This account features heavily in political and interest 
group commentary and elements of it appear in legal and other 
scholarship.36 
The notion that ownership develops one’s civic “personality” is well 
entrenched in American culture, dating back to the early American 
understanding of property and its linkages to civic republican theory.37  
Hendrik Hartog describes the conception of property, in particular real 
property, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as “tied to the very 
possibility of an individualized personality, to a classical notion of 
34. See Nat’l Ass’n of Realtors, Social Benefits of Homeownership and Stable Housing 
14 (2010), available at 
http://www.realtor.org/Research.nsf/files/05%20Social%20Benefits%20of%20Stable%2
0Housing.pdf/$FILE/05%20Social%20Benefits%20of%20Stable%20Housing.pdf (on file 
with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing homeownership differs from renting because of 
“pride of ownership and the sense of belonging in a community where one has a financial 
stake in the neighborhood”); see also Lorna Fox, Conceptualising Home:  Theories, Laws and 
Policies 145 (2007) (describing home as “a complex and multi-dimensional interest, which 
includes financial, practical, social, psychological, cultural, politico-economic and emotional 
interests to its occupiers”).   
35. Edward G. Goetz, Is Housing Tenure the New Neighborhood Dividing Line?:  The
Polarizing Politics of Homeownership, in Chasing the American Dream, supra note 3, at 96, 
102. 
36. For a review of the political and scholarly commentary on the personality-
developing capacity of ownership, see Vale, supra note 3, at 17–24, 39–40. 
37. Classical civic republican theory has been superimposed on American notions of 
homeownership.  See Fergus O’Ferrall, Civic-Republican Citizenship and Voluntary Action, 
The Republic, Spring/Summer 2001, at 126, 133 (characterizing civic republican theory’s 
articulation of participatory democracy as “highest form of living-together”).  Relatedly, 
Eduardo Peñalver describes Aristotelian “virtue ethics” as stable dispositions for engaging 
in behaviors conducive to human flourishing and contends generally that virtue ethics 
should shape the normative goals of property law.  Peñalver, supra note 3, at 867–69.  
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citizenship.”38  Through the twentieth century to the present, and 
especially following the Hoover Administration housing propaganda, 
these beliefs have morphed to focus on homeownership in particular as a 
moral and political agent.39  Under this view, homeownership builds 
“moral muscle”40 and creates a medium on which citizenship virtues are 
likely to flourish.41  This tradition has influenced academic accounts.  A 
thought-provoking body of recent scholarship contemplates (and debates) 
under what circumstances ownership and other property institutions 
promote “virtue ethics” or behavior consonant with a well-lived life and 
societal flourishing.42 
Another important aspect of the transformation account is that 
ownership confers greater social status43 and constitutes a self-fulfilling 
prophecy of better citizenship behavior.44  Citizen contentment with the 
American trump card of homeownership also enhances social stability and 
offers an “antidote for disintegrating influences”45 (and, in the darker side 
38. Hendrik Hartog, Public Property and Private Power:  The Corporation of the City of 
New York in American Law, 1730–1870, at 24 (1983). 
39. See Vale, supra note 3, at 19 (discussing how homeownership “first gained 
prominence as a moral issue rather than a financial calculation”).  
40. See, e.g., id. at 26 (quoting National Association of Real Estate Board’s 1922 
booklet promoting social and moral components of homeownership). 
41. As Vale explains, the rise in homeownership was preceded not only by historical
and demographic shifts but also by “concerted efforts to instill an ideologically grounded 
belief in the moral value of the owned home.”  Id. at 15; see also David P. Handlin, The 
American Home:  Architecture and Society, 1815–1915, at 12–26 (1979) (collecting 
nineteenth century literary depictions of the home’s social meanings). 
42. See Peñalver, supra note 3, at 864–66, 878–80 (presenting theory of virtue ethics
and describing role of property law in incentivizing virtuous behavior).  But cf. Eric R. 
Claeys, Response:  Virtue and Rights in American Property Law, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 889, 892 
(2009) (discussing concerns about applying virtue ethics outside of its “historical and 
political context” to modern property law). 
43. See Lynne Dearborn, Homeownership:  The Problematics of Ideals and Realities, 16 
J. Affordable Housing & Community Dev. L. 40, 40 (2006) (describing different levels of 
social esteem conferred on owners versus renters); Peñalver, supra note 3, at 835 
(“[H]omeownership uniquely signifies adulthood and responsibility, as well as the 
achievement of middle-class status.”); Winton Pitcoff, Has Homeownership Been Oversold?, 
Shelterforce, Jan./Feb. 2003, at 8, 10 (quoting Sheila Crowley, President of the National Low 
Income Housing Coalition, stating that “[r]enting is seen as inferior to owning”).  The link 
between homeownership and status, however, may place homeowners in a financially 
unstable situation, as they have an incentive to consume more expensive housing in order to 
enhance status.  See Robert H. Frank, Positional Externalities Cause Large and Preventable 
Welfare Losses, 95 Am. Econ. Rev. 137, 139–40 (2005) (explaining how social status 
concerns lead to expenditure shifts towards more expensive housing, hurting social 
welfare). 
44. In considering status-loss compensation for home loss, Rachel Godsil and David
Simunovich describe the social status conferred by homeownership as the byproduct of the 
“societal connection and stability” promoted by ownership.  Godsil & Simunovich, supra 
note 33, at 969–73, 998. 
45. Vale, supra note 3, at 20.
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of this vision, encourages citizen acceptance of inadequate welfare and 
rights protection).  Social ties play a role with owners’ greater residential 
stability and proximity to similarly enlightened homeowning neighbors 
enabling social bonds that promote moral and democratic behavior.46 
B.  Investment Stake Motives for Civic Behavior 
The second major account of the social gains from homeownership 
focuses on the propensity of the financial home investment to produce 
citizenship behavior, particularly at the local level.  Homeownership 
“stake[s] out a man’s place in his community.  The man who owns a home 
has something to be proud of and good reason to protect and preserve 
it.”47  The importance of investment traces back to the Lockean property 
theory that ownership and a private stake in land increase the productive 
use of land as well as human happiness.48  With respect to the citizenship 
virtues of homeownership, this notion of productivity has been 
transposed, in a manner that is at least in some respects opposite Locke’s 
vision, to ownership-related civic productivity.49 
The theme of investment stake is also prominent in recent law and 
economics scholarship on homeownership and land use.  The theoretical 
argument, exposited by economist William Fischel, is that homeownership 
cultivates investment in local goods and neighborhoods because homes 
are large, undiversified, and thus risky investments (and, relatedly, 
homeowners cannot exit without high transactions costs).50  The home 
investment motivates owners (even non-consuming owners) to “organize 
and make personal sacrifices” for community amenities that increase 
46. See id. at 26 (describing National Association of Realtors’ historical position that 
homeownership increased moral behavior in variety of ways, including by enabling “lasting 
friendships among worthwhile neighbors”). 
47. President Lyndon B. Johnson, Message from the President of the United States 
Transmitting a Message on Housing and Cities, H.R. Doc. 90-261 (1968).  In a similar vein, 
Senator Charles Percy explained in 1966, “The mere act of becoming a homeowner 
transforms him.  It gives him . . . a true stake in his community and its well-being.”  Charles 
H. Percy, A New Dawn for Our Cities, Address to the Kiwanis Club of Chicago (Sept. 15, 
1966), reprinted in 112 Cong. Rec. 27,258, 27,259 (statement of Sen. Wallace F. Bennett).   
48. See Ronald Tobey et al., Moving Out and Settling In:  Residential Mobility, Home 
Owning, and the Public Enframing of Citizenship, 1921–1950, 95 Am. Hist. Rev. 1395, 1395–
96 (1990) (“Although the Lockean notion that citizens should have a property stake in 
society had persisted as a major theme in American political culture virtually undiluted 
since the eighteenth century, it was the sheer power of the New Deal state that made 
possible implementation of the idea.”). 
49. See John Locke, Second Treatise of Government §§ 37–48 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 
Hackett Publ’g Co. 1980) (1690) (describing productive capacity of private ownership).  
However, according to Locke, people enter into civil society to protect the right to property 
and other rights.  See id. § 222 (“The reason why men enter into society, is the preservation 
of their property . . . .”).  Arguably, the current interpretation is the opposite:  People should 
own residential property to protect civil society. 
50. Fischel, supra note 4, at 4–12.
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property values, such as good public schools.51 
The investment stake scholarship, including Fischel’s “homevoter 
hypothesis,” has adopted a decidedly less transcendent view than the 
ownership-as-transformation account.  However, legal scholars have 
criticized its thin motivational assumptions and disregard of consumption 
interests (i.e., the value of using local public amenities such as schools, 
parks, property improvements, etc.) and noneconomic attachments (i.e., 
personal ties to place or generative desires to give back to the 
community).52  The investment stake literature also fails to address the 
propensity of investment motivations to promote exclusionary, and even 
discriminatory, land use regulation.53 
Beyond the traditional paradigms of investment stake and personal 
transformation, a smaller core of writing describes, or at least recognizes, 
influences other than ownership on civic behavior and local participation.  
Scholars such as Lee Fennell, Nicole Garnett, and Eduardo Peñalver have 
discussed “use” or consumption value from investment in local 
communities,54 the special motivations of parents of school-age children, 
55 and the role of social ties and community loyalty.56  Other scholars have 
described the influence of civic republicanism on modern understandings 
of property’s social obligations.57  This Essay seeks to extend this body of 
scholarship by analyzing the evidence of local civic benefits from 
homeownership, considering potential explanations for the pattern of 
empirical findings, and raising potential implications for housing policy.58 
51. Id. at 18.
52. See Fennell & Roin, supra note 8, at 162 (observing homeowners have 
consumption interests in community’s fortune).  For a recent account of the failure of 
investment stake theory to consider consumption interests and community loyalty, see 
Peñalver, supra note 3, at 832–41.   
53. See Fennell, Homes Rule, supra note 8, at 649–54 (arguing homevoter dynamics 
promote not only socially beneficial investment but also exclusionary behavior and socially 
suboptimal outcomes).   
54. Fennel & Roin, supra note 8, at 162; Nicole Stelle Garnett, Unbundling 
Homeownership:  Regional Reforms from the Inside Out, 119 Yale L.J. 1904, 1932 (2010); 
Peñalver, supra note 3, at 840–41. 
55. Garnett, supra note 54, at 1932. 
56. Id.; Peñalver, supra note 3, at 838–41. 
57. See Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 
94 Cornell L. Rev. 745, 745–52 (2009) [hereinafter Alexander, Social-Obligation Norm] 
(discussing historical influence of civic republicanism over property law in form of social 
obligation norm and advocating further development of this norm in modern doctrine); 
Carol M. Rose, Property as Wealth, Property as Propriety, in Compensatory Justice 223, 
239–40 (John W. Chapman ed., 1991) [hereinafter Rose, Property as Wealth] (describing 
tension in modern takings doctrine emanating from competing influences of civic 
republicanism and preference-satisfaction). 
58. See, e.g., Peñalver, supra note 3, at 838–41 (describing importance of social 
connections and noneconomic interests to homeownership behavior). 
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II. HOMEOWNERSHIP AND CITIZENSHIP EXTERNALITIES:  A CRITICAL REVIEW OF 
THE EVIDENCE 
What is the evidence for the extravagant vision that has animated 
legal and political accounts of homeownership?  This Part critically 
reviews the empirical research on the positive citizenship externalities of 
homeownership.  I utilize a broad definition of citizen virtues that accords 
with common understandings of good local citizenship and addresses a 
constellation of behaviors, effects, and attitudes that fall along the axes of 
civic engagement, socially beneficial investment in local goods, and 
community involvement.59  Specifically, I evaluate four subsets of 
citizenship effects frequently ascribed to homeownership:  (1) social 
capital measures; (2) local voting and amenity investment; (3) property 
upkeep; and (4) the “citizenship traits” of industry, autonomy, and 
satisfaction.  Because the available research employs different measures 
and varying methodologies, my assessment takes the form of a critical 
review rather than a statistical meta-analysis. 
Before turning to the research findings, a word of caution is in order.   
As with most areas of empirical study, researchers have not investigated 
every facet of homeownership effects.  For example, we don’t know if 
immigrant status affects homeownership attitudes or externalities or 
precisely why length of residence increases most civic behaviors.  Also, 
while recent studies control for hosts of individual and community-level 
variables, it is difficult to control for innate selection bias—that is, 
whether people who possess a preexisting orientation toward 
neighborhood participation, residential investment, and local political 
activity are more likely to purchase homes.60  Some research suggests that 
fixed individual differences may explain most of the variance between 
renters and owners.  A study of German residents surveying the same 
individuals over time found that the effects of homeownership on social 
capital and most forms of local amenity provision were slight (lower than 
the modest results from American studies lacking time-series data).61  If 
future research finds that this is also true of U.S. citizens, it would severely 
undercut the local citizenship justification for promoting homeownership. 
59. The conclusions of such an analysis depend on the definition and scope of
citizenship effects—if one looks solely at local voting patterns, for example, the conclusion 
would be that ownership causes a robust increase in citizenship behavior.  See, e.g., 
DiPasquale & Glaeser, supra note 5, at 365 (finding 77% of homeowners voted in local 
elections compared to 52% of renters). 
60. See Rohe et al., Social Benefits, supra note 2, at 18 (“None of the studies on this 
topic have totally ruled out the possibility that the association between homeownership and 
social and political participation is spurious.”).  Even longitudinal studies are not well suited 
to address this confound because of the varying propensities toward civic activity across the 
life cycle.   
61. See DiPasquale & Glaeser, supra note 5, at 378–83 (comparing findings from
German data set to findings from U.S. survey data).   
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A.  The Evidence of a Homeownership Effect on Local Social Capital 
Citizens foster community social capital through a variety of 
behaviors, including participation in local and nonlocal organizations, 
willingness to cooperate to solve collective problems, reciprocated 
exchange of favors, and socializing (which structures social networks and 
fosters trust).62  Homeowners are more likely to participate in 
nonprofessional organizations, help solve local problems, know the head 
of their school board, and engage in neighborhood activism.63  However, 
most of these differences are quite modest once the analysis controls for 
residential duration.  A 1999 national cross-section study using General 
Social Survey data, and controlling for a variety of socio-demographic and 
economic characteristics,  found that homeowners belong to 0.25 more 
nonprofessional organizations, are 6% more likely to have worked to 
solve local problems, and 9% more likely to know the identity of their 
school board head.64  When the data analysis added controls for length of 
residence, these differences shrunk to a few percentage points or less on 
most measures (the only measure virtually unaffected is local voting).65  
This suggests that the majority of citizenship effects operate through 
residential stability (or personal characteristics associated with high 
stability) rather than through homeownership.66
Not only are the positive externalities of homeownership much 
62. See generally Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone 31–148 (2000) (describing social 
capital theory and formation and assessing current trends in levels of social capital). 
63. See, e.g., Terry C. Blum & Paul William Kingston, Homeownership and Social 
Attachment, 27 Soc. Persp. 159, 171–74 (1984) (“[H]omeowners are relatively more apt 
to . . . join voluntary organizations, and to be enmeshed in local, neighborhood-based social 
networks.”); Cox, supra note 7, at 111–16 (“[H]omeonwership appears to have a 
nonspurious effect upon neighborhood activism.”); DiPasquale & Glaeser, supra note 5, at 
356 (finding homeowners are 9% more likely to know their school board head than renters 
and are more likely to attend church); Rohe & Stegman, supra note 9, at 159–64 (finding 
homebuyers show statistically significant increase in extent and intensity of organizational 
involvement compared to renters). 
64. DiPasquale & Glaeser, supra note 5, at 356, 366 (controlling for age, race, gender, 
marital status, income, high school graduation, educational attainment beyond high school, 
type of residential structure, and city size but not residential duration); see also Blum & 
Kingston, supra note 63, at 171 (finding ownership has only small effect on increasing 
membership in voluntary organizations); Glaeser & Shapiro, supra note 16, at 68 (reporting 
9.3% difference between owners and renters on participation in solving local problems and 
10.75% difference in local voting in analyses that controlled for a variety of background 
characteristics but not for length of residence). 
65. Controlling for length of residence means that the analysis compares owners and 
renters of similar residential durations.  DiPasquale & Glaeser, supra note 5, at 374. 
66. Specifically controlling for length of residence reduces the differentials on 
organizational membership by 91.7%, of working to solve local problems by 63%, and of 
knowing your school board head by 60%.  See DiPasquale & Glaeser, supra note 5 at 374, 
377 (finding between 4% and 92% of homeownership’s effect on various measures of social 
capital occurs because homeownership is associated with lower mobility).  
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smaller than commonly assumed, these effects fail to accrue to many 
subsets of local civic behavior.  For example, a longitudinal study of over 
one hundred Baltimore buyers before and after home purchase, compared 
to economically and demographically matched renters, found that 
organizational membership and intensity of participation in school, 
political, social, and religious organizations were not higher for 
homeowners (controlling for length of residence, presence of children, 
certain neighborhood characteristics, income, age, sex, education, and 
marital status).67  The only significant finding was that homeowners were 
more likely to join organizations and attend meetings at the sublocal level, 
specifically neighborhood and block organizations.68  In a similar vein, 
Rossi and Weber’s analysis of two national survey data sets found that 
owners were more likely to hold leadership and activist positions in local 
improvement groups, but did not differ in fraternal, recreational, or union 
group membership (controlling for age and socioeconomic status).69 
There is also no evidence of a positive effect of homeownership on 
local socializing.  The study by Rossi and Weber also assessed twenty-two 
sociability measures, including items such as spending a social evening 
with others, helping others, and engaging in recreational activities and 
social organizations, and found no consistent effect of homeownership on 
local or neighborhood socializing.70  Other studies similarly find no 
significant effect of homeownership on sociability and local social 
networks.71  And a recent study indicates—contrary to the prevailing 
assumption that homeownership promotes community and civic ties—
67. Rohe & Stegman, supra note 9, at 159–66.  Similarly, a recent study by Grace 
Bucchianeri found no difference in volunteer work between homeowners and renters.  
Grace W. Bucchianeri, The American Dream or the American Delusion?  The Private and 
External Benefits of Homeownership 17 (2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://real.wharton.upenn.edu/~wongg/research/The%20American%20Dream.pdf (on 
file with the Columbia Law Review). 
68. Rohe & Stegman, supra note 9, at 163–64.  Rohe and Stegman concluded that “[t]he 
impact of home ownership seems to be limited, at least in the short run, to immediate 
concerns in the local area.”  Id. at 167. 
69. See Rossi & Weber, supra note 9, at 15–17 (finding minimal differences in 
socializing between owners and renters from an analysis of over 20,000 subject interviews 
combined from the General Social Survey and the National Survey of Families and 
Households); see also Rohe & Stegman, supra note 9, at 167, 170 n.10 (finding homeowners 
show lower levels of neighboring behaviors as measured by five-question scale that 
assessed recognition of neighbors by face and name, neighborly relations, frequency of 
social interaction, and close friendships).  
70. See Rossi & Weber, supra note 9, at 16 tbl.7 (finding effects of homeownership on 
many sociability measures “not significant”).  
71. See Claude S. Fischer et al., Networks and Places:  Social Relations in the Urban 
Setting 149–50 (1977) (finding no significant effect of homeownership on neighboring).  
But see Blum & Kingston, supra note 63, at 173 (“People who own their own homes interact 
with proportionately more people they identify as their neighbors. . . . [T]he effect of 
homeownership on neighboring or locally based interaction remains significant after the 
control variables are entered into the equation.”). 
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that renters are more  likely than homeowners to socialize with 
neighbors.72 
Importantly, the research does not exclude the possibility that some 
amount of activity characterized as social capital is socially harmful and 
inapposite to citizenship “virtue.”73  Social capital measures that assess the 
frequency of local participation, socializing, density of social networks, 
voting rates, volunteerism, or monetary donations may be  insensitive to 
normative valence.74  While in general local social capital predicts positive 
community outcomes in safety, health, economic growth, and educational 
achievement,75 we should not forget that robust social capital also 
characterizes gangs, terrorists, hate organizations, and exclusionary group 
behavior.76 
B.  Local Voting and Amenity Investment 
The citizen-making capacity of homeownership is most strongly 
borne out in local voting and certain subclasses of local investment.  A 
large-sample, national study assessing the citizenship benefits of 
homeownership found that homeowners are 15% more likely than 
renters to vote in local elections77 and rate local voting as more 
“important” compared to renters.78  This difference does not disappear 
when controlling for length of residence79 (as well as age, race, gender, 
income, education, marriage, and housing structure type) suggesting that 
it relates to ownership rather than durational or other differences.80  
72. See Bucchianeri, supra note 67, at 15–16 (finding in a survey of 809 women in 
Columbus, Ohio that renters reported spending more time socializing, interacting, and 
engaging in active leisure). 
73. There is a growing literature on the “dark side” of social capital.  For an overview,
see Jan W. van Deth & Sonja Zmerli, Introduction:  Civicness, Equality, and Democracy—A 
“Dark Side” of Social Capital?, 53 Am. Behav. Scientist 631, 631–35 (2010) (summarizing 
contributions by different researchers in special issue exploring dark side of social capital). 
74. I thank Tim Iglesias for his comments on this point. 
75. See Mark K. Smith, Social Capital:  Civic Community and Education, Infed (2009), at 
http://www.infed.org/biblio/social_capital.htm (on file with the Columbia  Law  Review) 
(discussing studies showing “communities with a good ‘stock’ of such ‘social capital’” benefit 
in numerous  ways).   
76. See Stephanie M. Stern, Assoc. Professor, Chi.-Kent College of Law, Presentation to 
Association for Law, Property, and Society, Putting Social Capital in Its Place:  Subsidizing 
Residential Diversity 12 (Mar. 6, 2010) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (presenting 
dark side of social capital and using examples of Nazis and terrorists).  
77. DiPasquale & Glaeser, supra note 5, at 365. 
78. Rossi & Weber, supra note 9, at 23. 
79. DiPasquale & Glaeser, supra note 5, at 374. 
80. Some studies have found that homeowners show a greater rate of voting in 
national elections, but these studies do not control for length of residence, which increases 
the costs of voter registration.  See John L. Gilderbloom & John P. Markham, The Impact of 
Homeownership on Political Beliefs, 73 Soc. Forces 1589, 1596–97 (1995) (finding 
considerable impact of homeownership on voting in 1992 U.S. presidential election after 
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Other studies confirm this finding.81  It is not clear if tenants vote less 
because they feel socially disenfranchised, assume that voting 
homeowners in the community will sufficiently protect tenant interests, 
are ambivalent about voting for certain improvements or officials for fear 
of rent increases, or, as discussed in Part IV, do not perceive local voting as 
a citizenship responsibility of tenants.82  Notably, it is not clear that this 
result generalizes to political activities beyond voting.  At the local level, 
tenants and owners of similar residential duration report comparable 
levels of participation in political organizations.83  Research on national 
voting finds that owners are more likely to vote, but are not more likely to 
work to influence other voters, work for political parties or candidates, or 
attend political rallies.84 
In addition to political participation through voting, homeowners 
may also be more likely to politically support investments in (certain) 
local public goods.  There is some case-study evidence showing various 
suburban localities, driven by homeowner politics, make efficient and 
socially beneficial investments in high visibility or “big-ticket” items for 
home values, such as schools, landfills, and property tax rates (particularly 
as compared to state or regional control).85  Of course, it is difficult to say 
whether homeowner status drives these effects or whether they derive, at 
least in part, from resident or long-term resident (rather than owner) 
status or from inefficiencies in control at the state or regional level. 
There is limited support in the quantitative sociology and housing 
research for “homevoting.”  Studies find that owners are more likely to 
serve in leadership positions to improve neighborhood or block goods and 
services and to donate money to local improvements.86  When the study 
measure assesses collective action at the community level (e.g., have you 
controlling for variety of demographic factors but not for length of residence); see also Peter 
Dreier, Start Your Engines:  The Housing Movement and the Motor Voter Law, Shelterforce, 
May/June 1994, at 10, 10–11 (discussing barriers to tenant voting from cumbersome and 
complex voter registration laws); cf. Rossi & Weber, supra note 9, at 23 (finding owners are 
more likely than renters to have participated as voters in national elections but are “no 
more likely than renters to try to influence other voters, work for parties or candidates, or 
attend political rallies”).   
81. See Rossi & Weber, supra note 9, at 23 (concluding owners vote more frequently 
and participate more intensively in local politics than renters but that findings are more 
mixed for national politics).  
82. See infra Part IV.B (considering historical and civic republican explanations for 
divergences in homeownership-effects data). 
83. Rohe & Stegman, supra note 9, at 159–66. 
84. Rossi & Weber, supra note 9, at 23 
85. See Fischel, supra note 4, at 4 (“[H]omeowners, who are the most numerous and 
politically influential group within most localities, are guided by their concern for the value 
of their homes to make political decisions that are more efficient than those that would be 
made at a higher level of government.”). 
86. See, e.g., Rossi & Weber, supra note 9, at 24 (showing owners are more likely to 
serve on and donate to local improvement groups). 
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ever actively participated in working to solve a local problem?) the 
difference between tenants and owners is only a few percentage points 
(more than half of the 6% difference between renters and owners 
disappears with controls for length of residence).87  To my knowledge, the 
only quantitative data analyzing how homeownership affects local 
investment and local government spending comes from an unpublished 
paper.88  This study found that homeownership does not increase local 
investment but rather shifts it from local infrastructure (specifically, 
sewers, roads, and parks) to increased spending on education, police 
protection, and fire protection.89 
Notably, investment stake or homevoter dynamics drive not only 
socially beneficial investment but also exclusionary behavior, 
discriminatory practices, and other ill effects.  For example, Lee Fennell 
contends that, because the primary gains to school test scores and local 
property values derive from parent socioeconomic status, a substantial 
share of “investment” in public schools takes the form of support for local 
land-use policies (e.g., low-density zoning) that exclude less affluent 
incomers.90  The empirical evidence supports this intuition.  A recent 
study found that parent socioeconomic status, not monetary investment in 
schools, is responsible for nearly all of the increase in property values 
from local schools.91 
C.  Property Maintenance and Improvement 
There are positive effects of ownership on home upkeep and 
improvement and, consequently, on home values.  Owner-occupants 
spend more than landlords or tenants on repairs, are less likely to defer 
repairs, and are more likely to invest in improvements.92  Homeowners 
87. See DiPasquale & Glaeser, supra note 5, at 365, 374 (finding 63% of difference 
between renters and homeowners in self-reported participation rates in solving local 
problems disappeared after controlling for duration of residence). 
88. Albert Barnett Monroe IV, The Effects of Homeownership on Communities 102 
(Sep. 25, 2002) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University) (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review). 
89. Id.
90. See Fennell, Homes Rule, supra note 8, at 635–55 (describing homeowner 
preferences for homogeneity, and exclusion mechanisms).  
91. In a recent study, Brasington and Haurin found that while variations in 
expenditures per pupil and school characteristics did not have a significant impact on test 
scores, parental characteristics did (e.g., parent educational attainment, poverty status, 
single-parent headed household, etc.).  A change in the parental characteristics score from 
one standard deviation below to one standard deviation above correlated with a 14% 
increase in home value, versus no effect on home value based on a comparable increase in 
school inputs.  David M. Brasington & Donald R. Haurin, Parents, Peers, or School Inputs:  
Which Components of School Outcomes Are Capitalized into House Value?, 39 Regional Sci. 
& Urb. Econ. 523, 523–27 (2009). 
92. See Urban Policy Brief, supra note 12 (reviewing research showing owners spend 
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occupy significantly less dilapidated housing than tenants, presumably 
due in combination to less diligent landlord and tenant upkeep as well as 
quality differences between owned and rented structures.93  The better 
property upkeep associated with high homeownership rates creates 
positive spillovers for home values of neighboring single-family homes.  
Using national census data from 1980-1990, Rohe and Stewart found that 
for every percentage-point increase in a census tract’s homeownership 
rate, the value of single-family homes within that tract increased by 
approximately $800 per year.94  Other researchers have observed that 
most of the value-enhancing force of homeownership appears to derive 
from better home maintenance and landscaping.95 
There are, however, circumstances where upkeep and improvement 
are not beneficial.  Many home improvements do not “pay off” for 
individual property values or spillover to increase local property values 
(for example, investments in major remodels and new windows rarely pay 
for themselves at resale).96  Wealth effects also constrain individual and 
social benefits from improved upkeep.  Low-income owners spend less on 
upkeep (not only do they have less disposable income in general, but they 
are likely to be overinvested in the home purchase).  When low-income 
owners do invest in home maintenance or improvement, that spending 
often pushes them to financial crisis.97 
D.  Industry, Autonomy, and Satisfaction as Attributes of a Thriving Local 
(and National) Citizenry 
Certain individual attributes may have valuable spillover effects 
because they increase prosperity, democracy, and security, which in turn 
presumably enhance local (as well as national) citizenship.  The prevailing 
more on maintenance, are less likely than renters to defer repairs, and reported fewer 
housing problems).  
93. See Glaeser & Shapiro, supra note 16, at 65 (reporting results of American Housing
Survey showing that owners live in less dilapidated homes and noting that it is unclear 
whether this difference is attributable to homeownership or intrinsic differences between 
owned and rented units).   
94. Rohe & Stewart, supra note 27, at 66.
95. See, e.g., DiPasquale & Glaeser, supra note 5, at 362 tbl.1, 365 (finding gardening is 
one of the strongest homeownership effects with 72% of owners gardening versus 40% of 
renters); Glaeser & Shapiro, supra note 16, at 73 (interpreting regression as showing “that 
most of the benefits from local homeownership comes from better housing maintenance”).  
96. See Rosen, supra note 15, at 378 (“The usual Pigouvian analysis requires that 
subsidies be targeted specifically at those activities that produce the externalities.”).  
97. See Josephine Louie et al., The Housing Needs of Lower-Income Homeowners 3–5, 
23–24 (Harvard Univ. Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies, Working Paper No. W98-8, 1998), 
available at 
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/homeownership/louie_mcardle_belsky_w98-
8.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing how home maintenance and repair 
can financially overburden low-income buyers). 
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account is that homeowners are more industrious, autonomous, and 
satisfied than their tenant counterparts and that these attributes bolster 
citizenship and economic growth and forestall social unrest.98  Citizens 
well satisfied with the “American trump card” of homeownership are 
more likely to engage in productive activities and eschew disruptive 
protest and extremist movements.99  The historical record reveals deep 
roots to this vision with homeownership “the grandest foundation yet 
conceived, upon which to build up in our State an industrious, 
independent, self-sustaining and land-holding yeomanry.”100  Modern-day 
federal legislators have echoed these sentiments, proclaiming that 
homeownership confers psychological benefits by “giving people the 
confidence, self-esteem and the skills” for success in challenging economic 
times.101 
There is limited empirical evidence, however, that homeownership 
inculcates these citizenship attributes—or that these traits spill over to 
enhance local or national prosperity.  With respect to the effects of 
homeownership on labor, the research raises issues which rarely enter the 
public dialogue—the potential costs of homeownership to labor mobility, 
human capital, and job markets.  The evidence of homeownership’s effects 
on unemployment and underemployment is mixed.  The data is 
inconclusive about whether homeownership decreases the length of 
unemployment.102  States with higher rates of homeownership have 
greater unemployment, controlling for a variety of factors.103  Yet, data at 
98. See supra Part I.A (describing historical account of homeownership as personally 
transformative).  
99. See Vale, supra note 3, at 20 (describing historical roots of ideology of 
homeownership as “antidote” to “radicalizing influences”).  If indeed homeownership is the 
U.S. trump card, then it raises the troubling question of whether that trump card has also 
satiated citizens and dulled their demands for other types of public goods, such as health 
care.  
100. Report from N.H. Darnell to Hon. E.B. Pickett (Nov. 5, 1875), in Journal of the 
Constitutional Convention of the State of Texas 569, 570 (Galveston 1875). 
101. 54 Cong. Rec. S7449 (daily ed. July 25, 2008) (statement of Sen. Reed).  The 
legislative history of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act also includes statements by 
dozens of legislators referring to the “American dream.”  E.g., 154 Cong. Rec. S1359–60 
(daily ed. Feb. 28, 2008) (statement of Sen. Martinez) (“People are being foreclosed on, and 
there are families sitting at the kitchen table to see how to save that precious piece of the 
American Dream they have—their home.”).  The history also includes statements that 
legislators must act to stop the “American dream [from turning] into the American 
nightmare,” 154 Cong. Rec. S1407 (daily ed. Feb. 29, 2008) (statement of Sen. Menendez), 
and prevent “people [from] being thrown out of their castles . . . and thrown into the moat,” 
154 Cong. Rec. S5797 (daily ed. June 19, 2008) (statement of Sen. Boxer). 
102. In light of the sociodemographic differences between owners and renters in 
terms of education, income, and age, one of the better methods of studying the employment 
effects of homeownership has been through unemployment statistics (i.e., owners and 
renters all previously employed).  
103. See Richard K. Green & Patric H. Hendershott, Home-Ownership and 
Unemployment in the U.S., 38 Urb. Stud. 1509, 1517 (2001) (“[H]ome-ownership seems to 
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the individual level present a different picture:  Homeowners experience 
unemployment less frequently and for shorter periods of time.104  This is 
not surprising because homeowners need income to pay the mortgage or 
they risk losing their homes (and their real estate equity).  More rapid 
reemployment may also be due to the fact that homeowners’ decisions to 
purchase signal a higher demand for their skills and more secure 
economic prospects105 or from other variables omitted from the 
research.106  Issues of underemployment due to limited mobility (or the 
rush to re-employment) and labor market inefficiency have proven 
difficult to assess empirically.  Notably, however, the arguments about 
suboptimal sorting of workers to jobs as a result of homeownership’s 
constraints on relocation have not been empirically refuted.107 
The prognosis for homeownership and autonomy is even shakier.  If 
autonomy is independent decisionmaking and the ability to resist control 
from external forces or authorities, homeownership does not appear to 
increase net autonomy, but rather enables certain kinds of autonomy (e.g., 
control over physical changes to the house and the unilateral ability to 
elect to stay or move, subject to payment of one’s mortgage) at the 
expense of other forms of autonomy (e.g., mobility and financial 
flexibility).108  As a result of the financial demands of homeownership, the 
constraint labour mobility and thus leads to higher unemployment.”); Mark D. Partridge & 
Dan S. Rickman, The Dispersion of U.S. State Unemployment Rates:  The Role of Market and 
Non-Market Equilibrium Factors, 31 Regional Stud. 593, 599 (1997) (finding correlation 
between higher levels of homeownership and unemployment between states after 
controlling for demographic, market, and institutional factors). 
104. See N. Edward Coulson & Lynn M. Fisher, Tenure Choice and Labour Market 
Outcomes, 17 Housing Stud. 35, 38–42 (2002) (examining Current Population Survey and 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics data finding that homeowners experience less frequent 
unemployment and shorter durations of unemployment); Ernest P. Goss & Joseph M. 
Phillips, The Impact of Homeownership on the Duration of Unemployment, 27 Rev. Regional 
Stud. 9, 12–23 (1997) (finding home ownership significantly reduces unemployment 
duration because monthly mortgage payments stimulate more vigorous job search).   
105. This is not to claim that homebuyers are completely rational evaluators of their 
earnings or other aspects of their financial status.  The current foreclosure crisis, and the 
number of homebuyers who accepted high-risk loans, suggests that homebuyer rationality 
is imperfect.  Homebuyers likely suffer from over-optimism and bounds on their ability to 
process complex financial information.   
106. See Glaeser & Shapiro, supra note 16, at 72 (arguing “omitted variables are likely 
to explain” relationship between homeownership and unemployment).   
107. This argument is reflected in the Oswald hypothesis, which refers to the well-
known work of Andrew Oswald on homeownership, unemployment, and sorting.  See 
Andrew J. Oswald, A Theory of Homes and Jobs 1–3, 16–17 (Sept. 18, 1997) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/academic/oswald/homejobs.pdf (on 
file with the Columbia Law Review) (presenting theory of how homeownership depresses 
unemployment).  
108. Cf. Hartog, supra note 38, at 24 (describing historical conception of property’s 
role in creating autonomy defined in terms of “individualized personality” and “classical 
citizenship”). 
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home purchase may call the tune for family life (for example, traditional, 
thirty-year fixed mortgages often impose high demands in the early years 
of the mortgage whereas balloon ARM mortgages may severely burden a 
family later in time).  There is evidence that families routinely alter their 
work and childbearing plans to enable the female householder to return to 
the labor force prior to buying a house and in the early years when 
traditional mortgage debt is high.109  And, contrary to the vision of 
homeowners as autonomous and independent (and renters as beholden 
and enfeebled), most U.S. homeowners are in some ways “tenants of the 
bank,” with amortization schedules that defer the bulk of principal 
payments for many years or non-traditional loan products that result in 
little or no principal accumulation.110 
Turning to ownership and satisfaction, the evidence also does not 
support a robust effect of homeownership on happiness.  Earlier studies 
found that homeowners reported greater life satisfaction than renters, but 
that the effect is small.  For example, using data from over 13,000 
household interviews, Rossi and Weber found that that, on a five-point 
scale, homeowners reported scores only 0.04–0.27 points higher than 
tenants.111  In general, life satisfaction is most strongly linked to factors 
other than homeownership, such as health and the marital relationship.112  
Recent research has similarly found that homeownership does not 
increase happiness.  A study by Grace Bucchianeri reported that owners  
are not happier than renters once income, housing quality, and health and 
controlled for, derive more “pain” from their homes than renters even 
after controlling for financial insecurity, and spend less time on happiness-
producing activities such as interacting with friends and neighbors and 
engaging in active leisure.113 
109. See Robert D. Dietz & Donald R. Haurin, The Social and Private Micro-Level 
Consequences of Homeownership, 54 J. Urb. Econ. 401, 421 (2003) (summarizing research 
suggesting women’s total work burden increases in early years of homeownership relative 
to renters and later declines if mortgage debt is reduced); Jutta M. Joesch, Children and the 
Timing of Women’s Paid Work After Childbirth:  A Further Specification of the Relationship, 
56 J. Marriage & Fam. 429, 436 (1994) (finding 25% greater rate of return to work for 
homeowning mothers versus renting mothers).   
110. See Elizabeth C. Yen, Borrower Suitability Standards for Residential Mortgage 
Loans, 127 Banking L.J. 138, 156 n.11 (2010) (illustrating how amortization backloads 
principal reduction by calculating unpaid principal balance at various points during thirty-
year fixed-rate fully amortizing mortgage). 
111. See Rossi & Weber, supra note 9, at 14 (describing findings of homeownership’s 
effect on life satisfaction self-ratings).  
112. See Rohe et al., Social Benefits, supra note 2, at 3 (noting limited evidence tends to 
show positive association between homeownership and life satisfaction); see also Norval D. 
Glenn & Charles N. Weaver, The Contribution of Marital Happiness to Global Happiness, 43 J. 
Marriage & Fam. 161, 163–64 (1981) (finding marital quality is very important to personal 
happiness). 
113. See Bucchianeri, supra note 67, at 11, 15, 19 (finding in a survey of 800 Ohio 
women that homeowners did not report higher life satisfaction, overall mood, or moment-
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In summary, the citizenship effects from homeownership are uneven 
and, for some subsets of behavior, quite minimal. The social benefits of 
homeownership accrue most strongly in the areas of voting and, less 
surprisingly, personal property upkeep.  In contrast, and contrary to 
assumptions in the politico-legal commentary, homeownership has only a 
modest impact on local contribution to social capital and participation in 
local collective action.114  Homeownership also has mixed, and in some 
cases negative, effects on citizenship traits such as industry, autonomy, 
and satisfaction.  Amid the happy vision of civically engaged homeowners, 
the flipside of ownership, the effect of mobility and financial constraints 
on human capital, family life, and labor markets, has been largely ignored. 
III. LEGAL THEORY:  REVISITING OWNERSHIP’S CITIZEN VIRTUES
It seems that neither of the dominant theoretical accounts of 
homeownership’s citizen virtues has gotten it right.  To a significant 
extent, scholars and commentators have worked backward, taking 
isolated homeownership effects and inaccurately generalizing them across 
local civic behavior to conclude that homeownership creates both robust 
and far-ranging benefits.115  A particularized analysis reveals that the 
presence and magnitude of ownership effects vary markedly across types 
of local civic behavior.  Not only are net citizenship gains more modest and 
variable than assumed, the empirical research does not substantiate a 
unitary causal mechanism for homeownership effects.  For these reasons, 
it is difficult to reconcile the empirical evidence with any single root cause 
theory of homeownership’s social benefits.  And, of course, property 
tenure is only one force (and likely not the most potent one) affecting local 
contribution:  Culture, community cohesion, social norms, preferences, 
political ideology, and other socio-political factors, all beyond the scope of 
this Essay, play fundamental roles..   
With respect to the moral and political character of homeownership, 
the empirical research undermines the theory that ownership tenure or 
status prompts far-reaching personal transformation.  If the essence of 
this theory is prosocial transformation, then we would expect a consistent 
increase across various citizenship behaviors.  Yet, the research shows 
that homeowners do not join local and nonprofit organizations (other than 
to-moment happiness).   
114. See DiPasquale & Glaeser, supra note 5, at 356 (finding once length of residency is 
controlled, homeowners are approximately 2% more likely than renters to work to solve 
local problems).  Other research indicates that owners are more likely to take leadership 
positions, participate, and donate money to solve problems at the neighborhood and block 
level.  See Rohe et al., Social-Psychological, supra note 5, at 228–29 (differentiating between 
findings at local or national level versus neighborhood or block level). 
115. See supra Part II (describing political and academic theories of homeownership’s 
social benefits).   
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neighborhood or block organizations), engage in neighboring behaviors, 
or participate in informal socializing at substantially higher rates than 
tenants.116  The claims that ownership prompts personal transformation 
through increased social ties are also not supported by the research, 
except to the extent that homeownership correlates with longer length of 
residence (and, as noted below, other property forms can be structured to 
increase duration).117  Similarly, if homebuying increases social status, this 
change does not prompt the anticipated level of citizenship effects and, 
surprisingly, has little consistent impact on self-ratings of life satisfaction, 
happiness, and self-esteem.118  Although the empirical evidence does not 
support a theory of global transformation, it may be the case that a more 
particularized and modest “transformation” occurs for owners with 
respect to specific civic obligations, historically seen as the purview of 
property owners.119 
Also disturbing to the ownership transformation account is the 
finding that length of residence mediates many citizenship behaviors for 
both owners and tenants.120  Ownership as a form of property tenure, 
socialization to owner status, and pride of ownership do not appear to be 
the direct drivers of most citizenship effects.  Of course, homeownership 
alters individual behavior indirectly by increasing the costs of exit and 
prompting longer residence duration, which in turn affects social 
contribution.  But residential stability is not the exclusive province of 
traditional fee simple ownership:  A variety of property arrangements, 
including long-term renting, life estates, and shared equity ownership, 
increase residential duration.121 
The empirical research also reveals the investment stake model as too 
singular to capture homeowner dynamics.  Contrary to politico-legal views 
that investment stake drives prosocial behavior and local contribution 
broadly, owners do not make substantially greater contributions than 
116. See DiPasquale & Glaeser, supra note 5, at 356 (finding only modest differences 
between owners and tenants on many measures). 
117. For example, social interaction and neighboring are not greater for owners than 
tenants of comparable residence duration.  See supra notes 70–72 and accompanying text 
(reviewing research on impact of homeownership on socializing).  But see Rohe et al., 
Social-Psychological, supra note 5, at 226–27 (describing increase in social support 
networks for new low-income homeowners but not “leveraging” social networks for job-
seeking and professional advancement).  
118. See Rohe et al., Social-Psychological, supra note 5, at 23–26 (investigating 
psychological effects of homeownership on sample of low-income buyers).   
119. See infra Part IV.B (considering how civic republican tradition may affect modern 
homeowners’ understanding of their obligations and hence their behavior). 
120. See DiPasquale & Glaeser, supra note 5, at 374 (discussing effect of residential 
duration). 
121.  For example, DiPasquale and Glaeser note that “policies that act to limit mobility 
[will] end up having similar effects to homeownership-enhancing policies on increasing the 
level of investment by individuals in local amenities and social capital.”  Id. at 377.  
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tenants on multiple measures.122  The research shows that social capital-
enhancing behaviors such as social network behavior and neighboring 
generally do not differ substantially between similarly situated owners 
and renters.123  Contrary to the homevoting model, owners are not more 
likely than sociodemographically matched tenants to participate in school 
and political organizations (interestingly, the data may be consonant not 
with localism but with “sub-localism” in light of the evidence that the only 
organizations homeowners participate more frequently in are block and 
neighborhood groups).124  Even the findings for participation in local 
collective action, a paradigmatic form of local amenity provision predicted 
by the investment stake theory, are modest (a few percentage points with 
duration controls).125  In addition, the importance of length of residence to 
local contribution calls into question the investment model prediction that 
recent, more leveraged homebuyers will be more protective of homes 
(and home values) and thus more locally engaged than long-time 
owners.126 And of course, the investment stake theory presumes an 
investment stake in the owned home—an interpretation strained by 
recent trends with respect to home equity.127 
In keeping with an investment-incentive explanation, 
homeownership  does  promote better private upkeep (lease restrictions 
on alterations by tenants also explain this data).128  Homeowners also vote 
more in local elections,129 although this finding appears equally consistent 
with an investment stake rationale or a civic republican model of cultural 
influence.  With respect to political actions other than voting, however, the 
evidence of modest differences between duration-matched tenants and 
owners on active participation in political organizations and solving local 
problems may undercut the homevoting hypothesis that owners engage in 
greater political agitation for value-enhancing local amenities; answering 
122. See supra Part II.A (reviewing empirical research and finding modest 
homeownerships effects on social capital measures are largely attributable to length of 
residence).  
123. See supra notes 63–72 and accompanying text (reviewing empirical research and 
finding only slight differences between owners and renters). 
124.  Rohe & Stegman, supra note 9, at 163–64.   
125. See DiPasquale & Glaeser, supra note 5, at 356 (noting owners 6% more likely 
than tenants to work “to solve local problems”).  This result may be due to the measure’s 
failure to differentiate between problem-solving likely to improve property values versus 
other local collective action and philanthropy.   
126. See Fischel, supra note 4, at 12 (discussing new owners’ increased protectiveness 
with respect to local land use decisions). 
127. See U.S. Census Bureau, American Housing Survey National Tables:  2009, at tbl. 
3-15 (2009), available at 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/ahs/ahs09/ahs09.html (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review) (reporting national mortgage, loan, and value characteristics). 
128. See supra Part II.C (describing research on tenant and owner home upkeep and 
improvement). 
129. DiPasquale & Glaeser, supra note 5, at 365. 
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this question requires more nuanced data specifying the nature of the 
political organizations and collective action problems.130 
Research assessing social versus profit motivations for 
homeownership also undermines investment stake as a comprehensive 
theory of local behavior.131  Studies that have investigated homeowners’ 
profit orientation, based on their reported reasons for buying, find no 
statistically significant difference between owners with “economic/profit 
orientation” versus “social orientation” in membership or number of 
meetings attended in social, school, political, neighborhood, and block 
community organizations.132  Another study found that profit orientation 
had no effect on local activism;133 it is not clear whether the results would 
differ if measures targeted property-enhancing local investment rather 
than general activism.  In addition, research suggests that investment may 
play a lesser role in home buying than other considerations:  in self-report 
measures, two-thirds of owners state that the most important reasons for 
buying were social rather than investment.134  Of course, the 
methodologies to determine owner profit orientation are imperfect and, 
standing alone, this body of research may not be determinative.  But taken 
with the other available evidence, these findings are consistent with the 
basic points that the investment stake model does not explain many 
aspects of local contribution. 
This discussion is not meant to claim that investment motivations 
have no importance to individual behavior or to localism.  Rather, the 
variable pattern of findings in the empirical research suggests that people 
may have different motivations for different types of civic behaviors.  And 
in some instances they may have multiple motivations for a single civic 
behavior.  Investment and profit are undeniably motivations in certain 
contexts.  Arguably, however, some of the scholarly discussion has 
overextended Fischel’s “homevoting” hypothesis beyond the context of 
political agitation for certain property value-enhancing local amenities to 
encompass local civic engagement as a whole.  Even Fischel, who 
attributes much locally beneficial action to “homevoting,” notes that not 
every instance of homeowner political action or local behavior derives 
130. Rohe & Stegman, supra note 9, at 159–66 (finding no differences between tenants 
and owners in joining political organizations once they controlled for a number of resident 
characteristics); see DiPasquale & Glaeser, supra note 5, at 374, 377 (reporting minimal 
differences between duration-matched owners and renters on non-specific, 
undifferentiated measure “working to solve local problems”).   
131. See Rohe et al., Social Benefits, supra note 2, at 19 (noting there is little evidence 
to support investment orientation as mediator of social and local participation). 
132. See Rohe et al., Social Benefits, supra note 2, at 18 (concluding research does not 
support correlation between investment orientation and local and social participation). 
133. Cox, supra note 7, at 120–23. 
134. Rohe & Stegman, supra note 9, at 165.  
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from investment motivations.135  And, in circumstances where profit 
motivations are highly salient, market or informational imperfections may 
stymie investment-protective civic behavior (and thus increase parity 
between tenants and owners). 
Even if we were to accept investment stake theory uncritically, gains 
to localism do not require near-universal homeownership or even the 
present rate of homeownership.  First, tenants have consumption interests 
that frequently align with owners’ motivations.136  Tenants appreciate 
investments in public amenities (e.g., parks, good schools), unless such 
improvements make rents unaffordable.  Second, it is unlikely that a 
modest uptick in the tenant rate will undermine homevoter dynamics in 
the suburbs given strong owner-tenant residential segregation between 
communities and the high suburban homeownership rate.137  If tenancy 
rates increase in the suburbs, as a practical matter (and not a normative 
endorsement of the muting of minority interests) tenant numbers may be 
too low to generate policy-determinative political agitation or to sway 
outcomes on formal votes.138  We also lack information about whether 
there are diminishing citizenship returns to increasing homeownership 
rates, or “tipping points” in owner-tenant composition, beyond which we 
see declines, or less dramatic improvements, in civic behaviors where 
owners traditionally outperform tenants. 
With respect to the legal scholarship, the empirical research on 
homeownership lends support to scholars’ laments about the 
underinclusiveness of rational choice models and the omission of 
noneconomic motivations from some theories of ownership.139  The 
findings of minimal owner-tenant differences in local collective action, 
neighboring, and participation in most types of organizations, for example, 
suggest that forces other than investment stake are at play in producing 
local citizenship.  The evidence of the mediating role of length of 
residence140 and the similarity in local activism and community 
135. Fischel, supra note 4, at 12 (noting home asset is not only motivation for owners 
to be major political actors and that attachments to community developed over time may 
also play role).  
136. See Lee Anne Fennell, The Unbounded Home:  Property Values Beyond Property 
Lines 178–95 (2009) [hereinafter Fennell, Unbounded Home] (describing role of use and 
consumption interests). 
137. See Fischel, supra note 4, at 15 (observing more than half of U.S. population now 
lives in suburbs and homeowners are most numerous group within most localities).   
138. This is particularly true given tenants’ lower voting rates in local elections.  Cf. 
Fennell, Homes Rule, supra note 8, at 629–30 (arguing exclusionary zoning that maintains 
tenant minorities in suburbs has troubling implications for political participation and 
homevoting).   
139. See, e.g., Peñalver, supra note 3, at 835 (“The investment model of landowner 
behavior privileges the motivating power of exchange value to the detriment of ‘use 
value’ . . . .”).   
140. Or, the role of length of residence could support an exit cost explanation:  Owners 
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organization participation between owners with investment versus social 
orientations141 also supports (but does not prove) recent claims about the 
role of consumption value and social interests in motivating local 
behavior.  Of course, the data correlating increasing civic contribution 
with length of residence may also support a somewhat different version of 
the investment stake approach, with longer duration signaling a greater 
equity stake at risk of diminution (presuming people do accumulate 
increasing equity over time, are more risk averse to loss of equity than 
loss of debt, and have legal mechanisms for relieving themselves of 
mortgage debt).  If this is the only explanation, however, it is surprising 
that tenants show the same pattern of civic behavior increasing with 
residential duration.142 
IV. EXPLAINING THE PUZZLE OF VARIABLE CITIZENSHIP EFFECTS
To date, many accounts have inflated homeownership effects and 
failed to particularize the presence or absence of these effects to specific 
behaviors.  As a result, the pattern of citizenship effects across behavioral 
subtypes has not been recognized, much less examined.  In addition, much 
of the commentary and scholarship has:  (1) focused on economic and 
investment motivations to the neglect of psychological, social, and 
historical determinants; and (2) within the investment model, failed to 
anticipate predictable problems in the translation of investment 
motivation to citizenship behavior. 
In this Part, I attempt to fill this theoretical gap. My analysis advances 
the development of a multifactor theory to better predict citizenship 
behaviors expected to follow (or not) from homeownership.  Different 
civic behaviors likely have different causes (and individual behaviors may 
stem from multiple motivations).  I do not claim that property form is the 
exclusive or dominant driver of citizenship effects, or that I have 
produce higher levels of positive externalities regardless of investment or future value 
because their exit costs are high.  It is also likely the case that many long-term tenants have 
idiosyncratically high exit costs, both independently and as a result of each increasing year 
of tenure. 
141. See Rohe & Stegman, supra note 9, at 165 (finding profit orientation does not 
influence participation in social connection and local participation measures); Cox, supra 
note 7, at 120–23 (finding profit orientation had no effect on local activism). 
142. It may be the case that long-time tenants have an “investment” in below-market 
rent accorded informally by landlords to minimize turnover, or for other reasons.  This form 
of investment, however, is quite different and less certain than a saleable property interest.  
We might expect that if investment drives this effect for tenants, it would be a weaker effect 
than for owners because the “investment” in rent is typically of lower value and greater 
uncertainty than the investment in owned homes.  This is not supported by the data which 
shows, for several measures, no or negligible differences between tenants and owners, 
controlling for duration.  See DiPasquale & Glaeser, supra note 5, at 374 (“[T]he impact of 
homeownership decreases substantially when we control for length of community 
residence.”). 
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established a comprehensive theory of all social forces affecting local 
behavior.  Rather, I focus on property form as one predictor of local civic 
output and endeavor to describe factors underlying the pattern of 
ownership effects.    While the data does not “prove”  these explanatory 
factors, individual findings and the overall pattern of effects suggest 
whether certain motivations are at play, or can be ruled out, in specific 
contexts of civic contribution. 
Some of the factors considered in this section expand substantially on 
the considerations that influence individual action:  Not only is investment 
important, but so are psychological orientations, exit costs, perception 
biases, and historical and cultural understandings of ownership.  Other 
factors refine the investment stake theory by identifying circumstances 
that forestall ownership-motivated production of citizenship behavior.  
Overall, my analysis advances the scholarship by proposing a civic-
republican rationale for certain citizenship effects, delineating how 
perceptions of “investment” can derail the investment stake model, and 
considering the evidence for consumption and sociability motivations. 
Admittedly, it is difficult to discern the relative strength of various 
factors in producing or dampening specific citizenship behaviors.  
However, a multidisciplinary theoretical framework enables the type of 
empirical inquiry necessary to resolve questions of joint contribution and 
causality.  This approach also reflects competing motivations and forces 
affecting local behavior and offers the best fit to the empirical findings, 
which presently cannot be explained solely by investment stake, personal 
transformation, or social ties.  In addition, a multivariate model 
underscores the benefits of legal and social strategies that are similarly 
multifaceted in order to address manifold barriers to civic contribution.  
A.  Motivations for Citizen Behavior:  Consumption Interests and 
Psychological Orientations 
Unpacking the puzzle of disparate citizenship effects requires closer 
examination of the roles of consumption value and social-psychological 
motivations in residential behavior.  One likely reason that the divide 
between owner-tenant citizen effects for social-capital-producing 
behavior versus private upkeep and certain local amenity investments 
appears a puzzle is property theory’s relative neglect of consumption 
value and intrinsic sociability drives.  The variability in homeownership 
effects, and the mediators of these effects, suggests motivations in 
addition to ownership and investment.  Consumption benefits, personal 
attachments, social interests (and even the “investment” in below-market 
rent often accorded long-time tenants) may explain tenant contribution to 
beneficial local goods and social networks despite the risk of increased 
rents.   Scholars have criticized the “homevoting” model for its neglect of 
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consumption and sociability motivations.143  The discussion in this section 
supports (but does not prove) these claims and deepens the analysis 
within the context of discrete civic behaviors. 
Consumption value refers to an array of interests in the use of local 
public amenities, organizations, and, in my view, social networks. 
Residents are frequently motivated to invest in local schools, services, and 
organizations not for future financial gain, but because they or their 
children use these amenities.144  Citizenship behavior can be triggered by 
consumption benefits exceeding the costs of action, consumption plus 
investment benefits exceeding the costs of action, or investment benefits 
only exceeding the costs of action.145  Unlike homeowner investment 
motives, consumption value does not enlist the support of nonconsuming 
residents.146  However, this does not inevitably block local action.  As game 
theory illustrates, many social capital-producing behaviors and instances 
of local collective action require only a critical mass, not a voting 
majority.147 
For many citizenship behaviors, such as participation in social, school, 
and nonprofit organizations, neighboring, and even certain kinds of local 
collective action, the costs of action may be less than the anticipated gains 
from the consumption value and personal utility derived from social 
participation.  This dynamic motivates prosocial local behavior by tenants 
as well as owners.  For example, a tenant who derives significant 
satisfaction from attending a local recycling advocacy group, feels that the 
group has improved littering in her community, and finds that 
participation does not require too much time or energy, may participate 
despite the fact that she lacks an investment stake in the form of an owned 
home.  In some contexts where homeowners typically outperform tenants, 
such as block-level collective action, tenants may derive consumption 
143. See Fennell, Unbounded Home, supra note 136, at 140–42, 197–217 (describing 
role of consumption value and proposing new paradigm of homeownership that separates 
investment and consumption interests); Peñalver, supra note 3, at 834 (contending Fischel’s 
work neglects use value and personal attachment to community). 
144. See, e.g., Garnett, supra note 54, at 1932 (“[C]oncerns about home values are not 
the only, or even the primary, reason homeowners demand high-quality schools.  Parents’ 
primary motivation for moving to districts with high-performing public schools likely is a 
desire to secure a high-quality education for their children.”). 
145. While it may be the case that a tenant’s consumption interest is on average lower 
than an owner’s aggregated consumption plus investment interest, this difference does not 
matter when the consumption interest alone exceeds the threshold for action.   
146. See Fischel, supra note 4, at 4–6 (contending large, undiversified investment in 
home prompts homeowners to support local amenities that increase property values even if 
they do not use particular amenity).   
147. See Pamela E. Oliver & Gerald Marwell, Whatever Happened to Critical Mass 
Theory?:  A Retrospective and Assessment, 19 Soc. Theory 292, 308–09 (2001) (describing 
their “empirical claim that relatively small groups of people are often at the core of 
action. . . . [T]he initial participants motivate future participants . . . .”).   
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value but not enough to tip the scales toward action.148 
The importance of residential stability to citizenship effects may also 
support, albeit indirectly, the role of consumption interests in resident 
behavior.  Consumption value may be particularly important when exit 
costs are high because residents cannot easily move to new communities 
in order to satisfy consumption desires.149  Homeownership carries high 
exit costs due to the transaction costs of selling and relocating.  However, a 
subset of tenants may also have high exit costs from aspects of their 
personal situations, such as school-age children, commuting limitations, or 
below-market rent.  In particular, a long length of residence may be a 
signal that a tenant has high consumption gains and idiosyncratically 
steep exit costs from a given residence; such tenants are more likely to 
work to solve local issues and exercise their political voice rather than 
relocate.150  An interaction between residential duration, consumption 
value, and exit costs is not the only explanation for the importance of 
length of residence to civic contribution; but it may account, at least in 
part, for the minimal differences between long-term owners and 
comparable tenants on multiple measures.151 
My analysis also frames sociability as a specific kind of consumption 
interest.  In some instances, the process of working toward a collective 
goal is as important, or even more important, than the desired outcome.152  
Participation and interaction tap universal drives for sociability—drives 
which exist whether cultures espouse private property, common property, 
or nomadic residential forms.153  The work of John Cacioppo and other 
148. For example, tenants may contribute less to block and neighborhood collective 
action because they have greater mobility within communities or even because they feel 
unwelcome in neighborhood initiatives traditionally viewed as the province of 
homeowners. 
149. See Lee Anne Fennell, Exclusion’s Attraction:  Land Use Controls in Tieboutian 
Perspective, in The Tiebout Model at Fifty:  Essays in Public Economics in Honor of Wallace 
Oates 163, 166–67 (William A. Fischel ed., 2006) (describing Tiebout model, which suggests 
people vote with their feet through residential choices for preferred local services and 
amenities, and discussing constraints on model such as commuting); see also Garnett, supra 
note 54, at 1932 (noting parents’ desire for strong and stable educational settings for their 
children). 
150. See generally Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (1970) (proposing 
members of group can react to deteriorating conditions either by exiting or by voicing their 
grievance or protesting). 
151. The impact of length of residence on civic contribution may be due to a variety of 
other factors:  the effect of an increasing equity stake, a predisposition for both stability and 
civic behavior, or deepening community and social ties over time.  For research establishing 
the critical role of residential duration in producing homeownership effects, see DiPasquale 
& Glaeser, supra note 5, at 356 (describing homeownership effect findings and investigating 
what portion of those effects operate through residential stability).  
152. For example, many people derive great satisfaction from the social and group 
aspects of political campaigns, voluntary activities, and religious organizations. 
153. See John T. Cacioppo & William Patrick, Loneliness:  Human Nature and the Need 
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researchers has described how the need for sociability is so fundamental 
to human existence that loneliness affects not only mental health but also 
eating habits, sleep, blood pressure, and mortality.154  Indeed, some 
researchers have theorized that the human drive for social contact and 
orientation toward group cooperation is the major evolutionary 
advantage of humans, who lack the speed, strength, and natural defenses 
of other species.155 
The social psychology research illuminates the central importance 
not only of sociability as a general matter, but specifically of face-to-face 
contact and group formation.156  With this research in view, it is apparent 
how many citizenship behaviors may appeal to intrinsic sociability drives.  
This research affords a new perspective on why renters may perform 
similarly to owners on measures such as participating in local or national 
organizations,157 spending social evenings with friends in the community, 
and neighboring behaviors.158  Social-psychological motivations also offer 
a thought-provoking rationale for why owners engage in local collective 
problem-solving at levels only modestly higher than tenants, controlling 
for length of residence.159  Such efforts frequently entail not only 
instrumentally productive but also intrinsically satisfying face-to-face 
contact with others, collective membership and identity, and realization of 
for Social Connection 57–61, 64–72 (2008) (describing sociability in hunter-gatherer tribes 
and theory of common evolutionary basis of desire for social connection).   
154. See John T. Cacioppo et al., Loneliness Within a Nomological Net:  An Evolutionary 
Perspective, 40 J. Res. Personality 1054, 1081 (2006) (finding lonely young adults are 
higher in anxiety, anger, negative mood, and fear of negative evaluation and lower on 
variety of mental health measures, including emotional stability, sociability, and optimism 
than young adults who are not lonely); Mark Snyder & Nancy Cantor, Understanding 
Personality and Social Behavior:  A Functionalist Strategy, in 1 The Handbook of Social 
Psychology 635, 657 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998) (noting importance of social 
ties and interaction). 
155. See Cacioppo & Patrick, supra note 153, at 12–23 (describing centrality of 
sociability and cooperation to human survival and advancing hypothesis that pain of 
loneliness is evolutionary cue to repair social bonds and share resources and defenses with 
others).   
156. See id. at 258–60 (describing limitations of electronic communication such as e-
mail). 
157. This is not to claim that residential communities are romanticized “Our Towns” 
comprised of intimate and longstanding ties—they are not.  For a description of the weak 
ties characterizing modern residential communities, see Stern, Residential Protectionism, 
supra note 19, at 1122–24. 
158.  Indeed, there is some evidence that tenants socialize more frequently than 
owners, perhaps because tenants experience less conflict with neighbors over their 
property upkeep or because landlord responsibility for maintenance enables more free time 
for socializing.  Sociable tenants thus may create positive spillovers for homeowners and 
communities, including greater “bridging capital” which links different social groups and 
promotes the flow of information.  See Putnam, supra note 62, at 22–23 (distinguishing 
bridging social capital from bonding social capital). 
159. See DiPasquale & Glaeser, supra note 5, at 356 (reporting modest differences 
between tenants and owners on working together to solve local problems).   
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group efficacy.  In contrast, voting and investing in certain types of local 
amenities do not offer the same immediate social reward, at least absent 
involvement in campaigns or activist groups.160 
Of course, the homeownership data does not “prove” a role for 
consumption and sociability or exclude other explanations.  But, the 
findings of owner-tenant parity in certain civic domains, the impact of 
length of residence, and the psychology research on the centrality of 
sociability to human motivation all strongly suggest that these 
noneconomic interests factor significantly in local civic behavior. 
B.  Historical and Cultural Understandings of Owner­Citizen Obligations 
It may be that owners do not perceive actions such as voting and local 
governance as investments but rather as civic obligations grounded in 
their status as property owners.  Historically, under the influence of civic 
republican ideals, traditional governance authority and voting were the 
province and obligation of property owners.161  At the local level, citizen-
owners held local political office and led efforts to provide infrastructure.  
From the pre-Revolutionary era to the mid- to late-nineteenth century, the 
right to vote depended on property ownership, typically real property.162  
The view, expounded eloquently by Jefferson, was that property in land 
was requisite to independence and consequently to civic virtue, common 
self-rule, and participation in governance (industry and other forms of 
property lent themselves to autonomy-threatening involvement in 
nonagrarian commerce).163  Voting restrictions thus excluded “persons as 
160. In addition, with respect to some kinds of local voting and certain (not all) local 
investments, tenants may also face conflicting consumption interests between improved 
local goods or services and the risk of raised rents.  See Fennell & Roin, supra note 8, at 
162–63 (discussing tenant stakes and problem of displacement from gentrification).  
161. See Rose, Property as Wealth, supra note 57, at 235–36 (observing civic 
republican thought viewed property as conferring independence and autonomy required 
for self-rule). 
162. See Alexander Keyssar, The Right to Vote:  The Contested History of Democracy in 
the United States 2–15 (rev. ed. 2009) (noting most colonies required ownership of a 
quantum of land or land value but some property requirements focused on personal 
property of a certain value or payment of a certain amount of taxes); see also Clive Crook, 
Housebound, Atlantic Monthly, Dec. 2007, available at 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2007/12/housebound/6419 (on file with 
the Columbia Law Review) (“The cultural importance of homeownership has deep roots.  In 
many societies, owning property was once a requirement for full citizenship, and almost all 
Western democracies gave property owners the vote first.”).   
163.  Gregory S. Alexander, Commodity and Propriety:  Competing Visions of Property 
in American Legal Thought 1776–1990, at 29 (1997) [hereinafter Alexander, Commodity 
and Propriety].  Virtue was a byproduct of ownership and described the “willingness of a 
citizen to subordinate his or her individual wants for the well-being of the entire polity.”  Id.  
As J.G.A. Pocock described, “[t]he citizen possessed property in order to be autonomous and 
autonomy was necessary for him to develop virtue or goodness as an actor within the 
political, social and natural realm or order.”  J.G.A. Pocock, Virtue, Commerce, and History 
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are in so mean a situation that they are esteemed to have no will of their 
own . . . [and who] would be tempted to dispose of [their votes] under 
some undue influence or other.”164 
The civic republican tradition permeates modern-day property law 
and ownership conceptions.  Carol Rose has described the tensions in 
property law emanating from the conflict between the historical legacy of 
civic republicanism, or property as propriety, and the emphasis on 
property as an economic commodity.165  She notes that contrary to 
modern investment-stake and other value-maximizing theories, 
“[r]epublicanism . . . associate[s] property with governance and good 
order” and was “more or less indifferent to encouraging accumulation or 
aggregate wealth.”166  She attributes the “muddle” of the takings doctrine 
to the competing influences of modern utilitarian-economic views versus a 
land-focused conception of civic republicanism and obligations to the 
public interest.167  Gregory Alexander’s research also explores in depth the 
influence of civic republicanism in both historical and modern property 
law.168 
This historical perspective provides an alternative, or at least an 
additional, explanation for “homevoter” behavior:  Homeowners assume 
their historical and culturally understood obligations to vote and support 
local governance.169  Civic republican thought, as well as the ideological 
construction of the owned home as an anchor to democratic society, fuels 
this vision of ownership.170  The civic republican explanation is consistent 
103 (1985); see also Rose, Property as Wealth, supra note 57, at 235–36 (describing link 
between autonomy and property in land in early American civic republican thought).   
164. Ed Crews, Voting in Early America, Colonial Williamsburg J., Spring 2007, at 22, 
26 (quoting William Blackstone). 
165. See Rose, Property as Wealth, supra note 57, at 225–28, 232–35 (discussing 
ideological constructions of property as preference satisfaction and as propriety).  For 
example, in her analysis of takings jurisprudence, Rose describes how seeming anomalies, 
such as its strong protection against physical invasion, the lesser protection accorded to 
regulatory takings, and the balancing of private loss against public advantage all echo the 
vision of property as both governance authority and community obligation.  Id. at 239–40. 
166. Id. at 236.  Indeed, the concern was that grossly unequal wealth distribution 
threatened to corrupt civic virtue.  See id. at 235–37 (“[I]n a republic, the people rule 
themselves, and as a consequence a much broader range of citizens needed to have 
property.”).   
167. Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed:  Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 
S. Cal. L. Rev. 561, 594–95 (1984) (observing that conflicting views of what it means to own 
property underlie confusion in takings doctrine).  
168. See generally Alexander, Commodity and Propriety, supra note 163, at 21–72, 
311–51 (providing historical and sociopolitical analysis of civic republican theory in 
American property law and thought); Alexander, Social-Obligation Norm, supra note 57, at 
746–52 (discussing history of civic republicanism and advocating further development of 
social obligation norm in modern doctrine). 
169. I thank Larissa Katz for her insights and comments on this point.  
170. See Vale, supra note 3, at 15–20 (describing ideological construction of 
homeownership). 
136 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 100:2 
with the findings that owner-citizens vote more frequently in local (and 
national) elections and participate disproportionately in neighborhood 
leadership and local governance, but do not show increased general 
organizational participation, socializing, or neighboring.171  In this sense, it 
may be that the account of ownership transformation holds true, but much 
more narrowly than it is currently framed.  Home purchase may activate a 
set of traditional understandings and responsibilities for new owners.  
Conversely, compared to owners of similar income and residential 
duration, tenants may not perceive local voting or certain forms of local 
leadership and amenity investment as their obligation or even within their 
proper role (perhaps particularly for the election of officials with long-
term governance responsibilities).  It seems uncommon and even 
controversial, for example, for residents who rent rather than own to run 
for local office. 
Of course, there are elements of the civic republican philosophy that 
do not map as neatly onto ownership behaviors, perhaps because they are 
aspirational rather than descriptive.  For example, despite the primacy of 
owner philanthropy in civic republican writing, a question remains 
whether owners historically engaged (or engage today) in greater 
philanthropy toward the less fortunate compared to economically and 
demographically matched renters.172  The research also indicates that 
there is a smaller differential between tenants and owners with respect to 
participation in local political organizations, collective action, and political 
and activist campaigns than the civic republican tradition might 
suggest.173  This may be due to the strong emphasis on voting in civic 
republicanism or a cultural view that political agitation has a grassroots 
ethos culturally ascribed to tenants as well as owners. 
An alternative interpretation of the voting data is that it supports the 
investment stake or homevoting model:  Homeowners vote more 
frequently in local elections to protect their home investment.  However, 
the homevoting model avowedly focuses on political pressure for 
amenities rather than voting within local representative democracy (on 
the theory that the election of local representatives is too attenuated and 
indirect to support the homevoting claim that political agitation by owners 
promotes efficient and beneficial local investment).  The empirical data 
shows somewhat opposite effects:  Owners vote more in local elections 
than tenants but do not participate more intensely in some other forms of 
171. See supra Part II.A–B (reviewing empirical research examining connection 
between homeownership and social capital measures). 
172. See Rose, Property as Wealth, supra note 57, at 237 (noting “it was understood 
that the ill-fortune of others presented the propertied with a duty to assist, and not with an 
occasion to revile or shame those in need” but that “the practice of generosity and 
contribution was certainly subject to the predictable limitations of personal cupidity”).   
173. See supra notes 67–69 and accompanying text (finding little difference between 
homeowners and renters on organizational participation measures). 
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political activity (e.g., political organizations).174  Also, the ownership 
effect in local voting does not diminish when studies control for length of 
residence.  Yet, presumably investment motivations vary over time based 
on the degree to which an owner is overleveraged or values protecting 
increasing equity  in the home.  On balance, it seems at least as likely, if not 
more, that the voting data supports a civic republican explanation than an 
investment stake one. 
C.  The Role of Perception:  When Investments Don’t Seem Like Investments 
Investment plays a significant part in certain homeownership effects, 
though not so overriding or ubiquitous a role as some commentary and 
scholarship suggest.  For certain behaviors, such as private upkeep, the 
investment incentive for owners is both strong and salient.  In other 
instances, owners and tenants possess similar consumption value or social 
motivations and thus investment stake explains much of the variance in 
homeownership effects—not because it is the dominant or exclusive 
motivation for producing citizenship behavior, but because it is one of the 
few ways that socio-demographically matched tenants and owners differ.  
In these cases, if the prerequisites of the investment model are not firmly 
in place, differences between tenants and owners may fail to emerge. 
Investment stake effects require that owners understand the value of 
local action and anticipate attractive yields from such investments. 
Perceptions of what constitutes investment determine the positive 
externalities produced from owner profit motivation.  Researchers have 
shown that local social capital and networks bolster economic prosperity, 
reduce crime, and increase health—this counterintuitive finding is part of 
the insight (and academic allure) of social capital theory.175 However, 
owners frequently do not perceive social-capital enhancing behaviors as 
“investments” that will pay off at resale.  Why should joining a bowling 
league, the vivid example in Robert Putnam’s book Bowling  Alone, or 
participating in neighborhood block parties improve community 
outcomes and property values?176  For tenants, these perceptions may be 
a reason why fear of rising rents does not inevitably constrain local 
contribution.  For many behaviors, such as most forms of organizational 
participation, neighboring, and certain kinds of local collective action, 
tenants may see these actions as unlikely to increase property values and 
174. For example, controlling for residential duration, owners do not participate more 
frequently than tenants in political organizations, including local political organizations.  
Rohe & Stegman, supra note 9, at 163–64 (finding differences in participation only in 
neighborhood and block organizations, not political organizations). . 
175. See Putnam, supra note 62, at 305, 314, 319, 328 (reviewing research on social 
capital’s positive effect on crime, education, community health, and individual, firm, and 
community economic prosperity). 
176. Id. at 112–13.  
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make rents unaffordable. 
The nonintuitive relationship between certain civic behaviors and 
property values may reconcile seeming discrepancies in the research.  
With other factors held equal, when it is not intuitive that action will affect 
property values in a nontrivial way, we might expect the differential 
between renters and owners to shrink precipitously.  And in many cases 
this is exactly what we see.  Joining a neighborhood or block association 
(behaviors which homeowners do engage in more frequently than 
renters) has a more obvious and certain return on investment than joining 
recreational, fraternal, or other local organizations (behaviors that are 
more evenly dispersed between owners and renters).177  Perception also 
suggests an explanation for why owners and renters report slight or no 
differences on most measures of neighboring and social connection:  The 
property-value-enhancing effects of socializing with neighbors are not 
obvious to residents.  Moreover, both owners and renters presumably 
engage in social behaviors based in significant part on nonfinancial, 
personal utility. 
For some behaviors, such as local volunteering, participation in local 
events, or working to solve certain types of local problems, residents 
probably have a vague sense that a critical mass of people doing some 
number of these things is “good for the community.”  But, the motivation 
to invest in order to enhance one’s property value is attenuated by the 
nebulous link between specific social capital inputs and property value 
outputs.  It has been a challenge for social capital researchers—much less 
local residents—to determine what types and levels of individual and 
community action will produce specific community outcomes.  In addition, 
there may be collective action impediments to sufficient participation (an 
unresolved circularity to the social capital literature is that social capital 
seeks to resolve the collective action problems caused by lack of social 
capital). 
D.  Information Costs and Social Capital 
Even if owners perceived the economic value of social capital-
producing action and related citizenship behaviors, they would still 
underproduce these behaviors because homebuyers lack information (or 
themselves don’t perceive these activities as important to community 
outcomes).  For the typical behaviors addressed in the homevoting 
literature, capitalization of certain local investments into home values 
occurs because buyers have ready access to information.  School-quality 
information is compiled in various independent ratings and state scores, 
parent sociodemographic characteristics are usually readily apparent, 
177. See supra Part II.A (reviewing empirical research on homeownership and 
organizational participation). 
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landfills and other environmental hazards attract strong media attention, 
and growth controls are visible in average lot sizes and town conservation 
areas.178 
In contrast, information about local participation, cohesion, and social 
capital is neither as salient nor as readily available to buyers as, for 
example, school quality measures.  Data about the intensity of resident 
participation in local associations, volunteering rates, collective problem 
solving, or friendliness of a locality are often costly for buyers to obtain.  
Certainly buyers notice the outcomes of high social capital—there is 
robust evidence that communities high in social capital experience better 
educational, safety, and economic outcomes—but they have limited 
information about the individual precursors.179  It is quite likely that 
buyers attribute these outcomes to location, community affluence or 
education level, or other factors. 
The information gap between local amenities and social capital 
measures may close in the future—there is increasing information 
available on town internet sites and in regional publications about local 
participation and various markers of community health (e.g., number of 
nonprofits and local organizations, etc.).180  In addition, a major 
educational initiative by the Saguaro Seminar is studying ways to promote 
local social capital and raising awareness of the role of social capital.181  
Even increased information availability, however, will not eliminate the 
dampening of owner motivation due to both owner and buyer 
misperceptions of the investment value of social capital and the link 
between specific social capital inputs and community outcomes. 
This analysis raises the question of whether investment motivation, 
and perceptual and informational failures impeding investment, explain 
entirely the pattern of empirical findings for homeownership effects (i.e., 
the lack of homeownership effects for social capital measures as compared 
178. See, e.g., Great Schools, at http://www.greatschools.org/ (last visited Jan. 29, 
2011) (on file with the Columbia  Law Review) (providing ratings and information about 
socioeconomic student composition of individual schools nationwide); Me. State Planning 
Office, Where Does My Garbage Go?, at 
http://www.maine.gov/spo/recycle/residents/wheregarbagegoes.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 
2011) (on file with the Columbia  Law  Review) (providing location information for all of 
Maine’s landfills).   
179. See Putnam, supra note 62, at 305, 314, 319, 328 (describing social capital 
outcomes research); supra text accompanying note 177 (discussing how salience of profit 
potential from local participation affects investment motivations and homeowner 
behavior).   
180. See sources cited supra note 178 (listing examples). 
181. See Saguaro Seminar on Civic Engagement in America, Better Together 4–7, 89 
(2000), available at http://bettertogether.org/thereport.htm (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review) (suggesting potential “institutional responses” to promote “civic revival” and 
enhanced social capital).  This initiative is also studying local efforts to enhance civic 
engagement.  Id. at 32–87 (discussing social capital efforts nationwide). 
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to upkeep or certain forms of local amenity investment).  On balance, it 
seems unlikely that investment is the exclusive motivation for civic 
contribution.  Duration-matched buyers and renters do not differ 
substantially on some measures obviously connected to property values in 
contexts where information is readily available to buyers.  For example, 
buyers can generally obtain information about school quality and parent 
involvement, yet owners do not appear to participate more than duration-
matched tenants in school organizations and groups.182  There are similar 
findings for participation in local political organizations.183  Also, an 
investment interpretation of the data does not explain the strong role of 
residential stability in predicting civic contribution for both tenants and 
owners.  Even if it were the case that investment motivation, either 
realized or failed, explained the variable pattern of homeowner effects, the 
pervasiveness of perception problems and information failures minimize 
the practical import of this theory.  If investment motives fail to elicit 
broad swathes of civic behavior due to perceptual and informational 
deficits, investment stake cannot serve as a predominant, much less 
comprehensive, theory of local contribution. 
V.  HOMEOWNERSHIP AND POLICY:  SOME THOUGHTS AND POTENTIAL 
IMPLICATIONS 
The primary goal of this Essay has been to unseat assumptions about 
the breadth and intensity of homeownership effects and to expose fault 
lines in prevailing theories of homeownership.  Taking an evidence-based, 
wide-angle view of the social benefits of homeownership reveals that, 
overall, the positive externalities from homeownership are more modest 
and particularized than much of the commentary suggests.  Although not 
the focus of my paper, I raise some potential implications of my analysis 
for housing policy.  The research on homeownership effects calls into 
question homeownership as a social strategy, suggests possibilities for 
targeting incentives to specific civic behaviors, and alleviates concerns 
about the civic effects of nontraditional ownership and alternatives to 
homeownership.   
Of course, within a body of empirical research, there are inevitably 
gaps in the data and limitations to the state of the knowledge.  We know, 
for example, that length of residence is important, but it is not clear 
whether this is due to preexisting dispositional differences of stable 
residents, growing attachments and ties to community, idiosyncratic exit 
costs underlying long-term tenure, or other factors.  There are also gaps in 
the research with respect to possible differences for immigrant residents, 
any effects of debt to equity ratio on homeowner behavior, and the 
182. Rohe & Stegman, supra note 9, at 159–66. 
183. Id.   
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comparative contribution to local citizenship from ownership versus other 
social forces or structures.  Accordingly, policy implications are subject to 
revision with future research, and my consideration of the policy issues is 
often exploratory rather than prescriptive.   
A.  Re­Thinking Ownership as a Social Strategy 
An important justification for the legal privileging of homeowning is 
that ownership creates more politically and civically engaged citizens who 
contribute to local communities (as well as national democracy).184  This 
justification is presented in some instances as a tenet of sincere belief; in 
other cases, the civic virtues of homeownership are gloss applied to the 
self-interest of housing industry, banking, realty, and other special 
interests.185  To the extent positive citizenship externalities and robust 
localism have justified homeownership subsidies, the empirical research 
calls into question both the rate and form of subsidy.186 
Analysis of the empirical research reveals a more modest level of 
social benefit as well as gaps in ownership’s capacity to produce local civic 
behavior.  The pattern that emerges across multiple, large-sample size, 
well-controlled studies is that  homeownership increases voting, property 
upkeep, and some forms of local investment, but has no or modest effects 
on neighboring, socializing, working to solve a local problem, or 
participating in voluntary or local organizations (with the exception of 
neighborhood and block groups).  The finding that in most instances 
length of residence, rather than homeownership, drives citizenship effects 
suggests that the true civic value of housing policy may be the 
subsidization of housing forms that constrain exit and promote 
stability.187  Notably, the belief in the intrinsic civic value of ownership has 
masked the mediating role of residential stability and forestalled honest 
184. See Glaeser & Shapiro, supra note 16, at 48 (“The efficiency arguments for 
subsidizing either the level of housing consumption or homeownership rely on the 
existence of externalities.”).  Citizen-making is not the only positive societal externality 
attributed to homeownership, but it has been a dominant one, both in the present and 
historically.  See Rohe & Stegman, supra note 9, at 153 (describing “variety of claims . . . 
about the benefit of homeownership over rental occupancy”).  
185. See Stern, Residential Protectionism, supra note 19, at 1105.   
186. Even with diminished subsidies, a large share of the population will purchase 
homes based on “taste for single family housing” and need for highly stable housing and 
schooling.  See, e.g., Glaeser & Shapiro, supra note 16, at 43, 80 (noting “homeownership 
depends to a considerable degree on taste for structure” and concluding from their analysis 
“the home mortgage interest deduction doesn’t have much to do with the homeownership 
rate”).   
187. It is not clear whether the civic benefits of residential stability operate through 
deeper social ties, strong consumption interests, increasing equity investment in real estate 
either through increased principal or investment in below-market rent, or another, “omitted 
variable” such as correlations between civic behavior producing personality traits and 
residential stability. 
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discussion of when (or whether) law should constrain or disincentivize 
exit. 
Moreover, the social benefits of homeownership (i.e., increased 
voting, investment in certain types of local amenities, and participation in 
neighborhood and block organizations) are the dividends of stable 
homeownership.188  The citizenship virtue of homeownership is, at best, a 
theory for good economic times.  Any reliance on ownership as a social 
strategy founders during economic shocks and housing downturns.189  
Struggling owners are not focused on local investment or social 
contribution but rather upon the immediate stressor of potential 
residential dislocation; in light of looming short sales or foreclosures, they 
lack investment motivation entirely.  As a result, the contributions of 
financially stressed homeowners, even in areas of traditional homeowner 
advantage such as private upkeep and voting, are likely well below the 
contributions of stable tenants and landlords.190  Ironically, in the current 
foreclosure crisis, the vision of the social benefits of an “ownership 
society” encouraged presidential initiatives that sanctioned, and by some 
188. Cf. Fennell & Roin, supra note 8, at 147–51 (describing social harms from 
foreclosure clusters and “understaked” homeowners).   
189. See, e.g., Joshua Rosner, Cleaning House:  Too Many People Own Homes, The New 
Republic, May 7, 2008, at 12, 12 (“Home owners now have less equity in their properties, 
and, as a result, the social benefits of home ownership have decreased; their ties to their 
communities have been weakened.”).   
190. Current federal policy disproportionately directs foreclosure relief to individuals 
who meet certain financial requirements rather than to communities at risk of tipping into 
social and economic decline or foreclosure spirals.  For example, while the Obama 
foreclosure relief plan pledges $75 billion in funding to programs that enable individuals to 
refinance or modify mortgages, only a little over $2 billion has been devoted to programs 
that spatially target foreclosure relief to neighborhoods, or more recently, states 
experiencing foreclosure spirals or at high risk of such decline.  Source Watch, Home 
Affordable Modification Program, at 
http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Home_Affordable_Modification_Program (on 
file with the Columbia  Law  Review) (last visited Jan. 29, 2011).  Compare U.S. Dep’t of 
Treasury, Making Home Affordable, at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives /financial-
stability/housing-programs/mha/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 17, 2010) (on file 
with the Columbia Law Review) (describing Making Home Affordable program that enabled 
more than eight million homeowners to “refinanc[e] their mortgage to more affordable 
levels”) with U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Hardest Hit Fund, at 
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/housing-
programs/hhf/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 17, 2010) (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review) (listing “targeted aid to families in states hit hard by the economic and housing 
market downturn”).  The first and second federal “Hardest Hit Funds” provided federal 
money to five states with a 20% or greater housing decline (Arizona, California, Florida, 
Michigan, and Nevada) and the five states with high areas of concentrated unemployment 
(Rhode Island, South Carolina, North Carolina, Oregon, and Ohio).  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t 
of Treasury, Administrations Announces Second Round of Assistance for Hardest-Hit 
Housing Markets (Mar. 29, 2010), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-
center/press-releases/Pages/tg618.aspx (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
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accounts affirmatively promoted, lax mortgage underwriting.191  In 
addition, subsidizing mortgage debt through interest deductions 
motivated buyers to overleverage themselves (because, subject to some 
tax limitations, greater debt produces a higher deduction) and increased 
their vulnerability to housing downturns.192 
The civic value of subsidizing homeownership is also called starkly 
into question by the effect of subsidies on housing consumption.  While 
the popular narrative of subsidies assumes their primary effect is to 
increase homeownership, the reality is that many government incentives 
affect the amount of house consumed rather than the homeownership 
rate.193  Buying a bigger house makes little difference to local civic 
contribution or the homevoter dynamic if the increased capital investment 
is funded by public subsidy (the potential exception would be if tax 
subsidies enabled low-income owners to buy and maintain homes in 
higher quality, lower risk neighborhoods but there is evidence that this is 
not the case).194  If the subsidy encourages buyers to spend more of their 
personal funds in excess of the subsidy benefit, there is still a question of 
whether an inflated ownership stake (or, more accurately, mortgage 
balance) increases social contribution and local investment.  We lack 
information about whether inflated spending is likely, for example, to shift 
owners from efficient investors to hyperprotective NIMBYs (“not in my 
backyard”).195 
A barrage of recent literature critiques other individual and social 
191. See Stan J. Leibowitz, Anatomy of a Train Wreck:  Causes of the Mortgage 
Meltdown, in Housing America:  Building Out of a Crisis 287, 292–98 (Randall G. Holcombe 
& Benjamin Powell eds., 2009) (describing how government policy encouraged lax 
underwriting).  But see Gary B. Gorton, The Panic of 2007, at 74–76 (Yale Sch. of Mgmt. & 
Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 08-24, 2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1255362 (on file with the Columbia 
Law  Review) (arguing information loss due to complexity of mortgage products and 
declining home values, not underwriting standards, were primary causes of mortgage 
meltdown).   
192. See Edward L. Glaeser, Killing (or Maiming) a Sacred Cow:  Home Mortgage 
Deductions, Economix, Feb. 24, 2009, at 
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/02/24/killing-or-maiming-a-sacred-cow-home-
mortgage-deductions/ (describing how subsidizing interests payments encourages people 
to leverage themselves to the hilt so price swings can easily wipe people out and proposing 
current one million dollar cap on qualifying loans be reduced over seven years to $300,000).   
193. With respect to the home mortgage interest deduction, Ed Glaeser describes how 
the primary effect of the subsidy is to increase the size and cost of the home purchase for 
middle- and upper-income citizens who were likely to purchase anyway.  Glaeser & Shapiro, 
supra note 16, at 40. 
194. See id. at 50 (describing how home mortgage tax deduction primarily benefits 
middle and upper income taxpayers who itemize deductions).   
195. Anecdotally, Fischel suggests that new buyers with greater debt and less 
accumulated wealth in the house are particularly sensitive to investment dynamics.  See 
Fischel, supra note 4, at 12 (noting “the size of the down payment and the newly acquired 
mortgage make new homeowners especially watchful of local activity”). 
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justifications for governmental promotion of homeownership and 
similarly concludes that we are not at the optimal rate of subsidy.196  Given 
the abundance of recent attention, I don’t wish to belabor the subsidy 
point.  But, it is worth noting that the positive civic externalities do not 
seem to outweigh the sizeable aggregated costs from the federal home 
interest mortgage deduction197 and capital gains exclusion for qualifying 
sales of primary residences,198 the non-taxation of imputed rent, 
foreclosure relief such as the Obama Administration’s Making Home 
Affordable program,199 state and federal homebuying assistance,200 and 
home-protective common law and state statutory creditor protections.201  
Moreover, reducing tax deductions and other subsidies will modestly 
decrease, not devastate, the homeownership rate because of the strong 
preference for single-family structures (and the predominance of such 
housing in sale rather than rental markets) and the ability of many 
households to reshuffle their portfolios and finance homebuying with 
196. Ed Glaeser, Paul Krugman, and other economists have been at the forefront of 
critiques of government intervention.  See, e.g., Glaeser & Shapiro, supra note 16, at 58 
(arguing while there are positive externalities from homeownership, “the home mortgage 
interest deduction may create negative effects by disproportionately encouraging spending 
on housing among the wealthy, and not among the poor”); Paul Krugman, Op-Ed, Home Not-
So-Sweet Home, N.Y. Times, June 23, 2008, at A21 (suggesting government “drop the 
obsession with ownership, and try to level the playing field that . . . is hugely tilted against 
renting”). 
197. For some consumption subsidies, such as the home mortgage interest deduction, 
national savings will be less than current tax “expenditures” to fund the deduction because 
many homebuyers will reshuffle their portfolios so that they reduce investments elsewhere 
in favor of more equity and less debt in their primary residence, buy less expensive houses, 
or rent.  See James R. Follain & Lisa Sturman Melamed, The False Messiah of Tax Policy:  
What Elimination of the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction Promises and a Careful Look at 
What it Delivers, 9 J. Housing Res. 179, 194 tbl.7, 195 (1998) (analyzing effect of eliminating 
home mortgage interest deduction and finding reduction in mortgage debt demand).  
Nonetheless, there is still significant savings, not only from reducing the home mortgage 
interest deduction but also from the panoply of subsidies and protections—savings which 
could be employed in more direct and targeted efforts to incentivize localism and local 
citizenship behavior.   
198. I.R.C. §§ 163(h), 121(a) (2006). 
199. Affordable Housing Programs Amendments:  Federal Home Loan Bank 
Refinancing Authority, 75 Fed. Reg. 29,877 (May 28, 2010) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. 
§ 1291); U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. & U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Making Home Affordable: 
Act Now to Get the Help you Need 1–5 (2010), available at 
http://www.makinghomeaffordable.gov/programs/Documents/MHA%20Brochure.pdf (on 
file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing various homeowner relief programs).   
200. There are a variety of affordable and low-income homebuying assistance 
programs.  For a review, see Collins, supra note 13, at 69, 85–90 (reviewing federal policies 
and grants to states). 
201. See, e.g., Homestead Exemption Act of 1981, Ark. Code Ann. § 16-66-210 (2005) 
(exempting homesteads from various liabilities); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 188, § 1 (LexisNexis 
Supp. 2010) (same).  For debtors filing bankruptcy, federal law limits the exemption to 
$125,000 for debtors who acquired property during “the 1215-day period preceding the 
date of the [bankruptcy filing].”  See 11 U.S.C. § 522(p) (2006). 
2011] COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 145
greater equity.202 
Admittedly, this Essay has focused on local civic effects and has not 
considered every positive externality of homeownership.  However, some 
of the other common justifications for privileging homeownership also 
appear modest in impact, or even weak or inconsistent.  For example, one 
frequently cited justification for homeownership is its role in wealth 
accumulation, primarily as a forced-savings device.203  However, recent 
data reveals remarkably modest wealth accumulation and a growing trend 
toward debt accumulation through loan products that allow owners to 
extract home equity.204  Another issue is the effect of homeownership on 
crime.  The evidence here is mixed.  There is data indicating that high 
homeownership rates reduce crime, though far less than factors such as 
reducing female-headed households.205  Other studies have found an 
uneven pattern of homeownership effects with ownership rate reducing 
the incidence of some crimes, specifically non-sexual violent assault, but 
not the incidence of crimes such as robbery or rape.206  On the whole, it 
seems unlikely that the benefits of personal savings or crime-prevention 
justify the current level of global homeownership subsidies and 
protections, particularly if direct, targeted subsidization or other 
initiatives can yield the same benefits with fewer public dollars.  
B.  Subsidizing Citizenship:  Targeting Incentives to Civic Behavior 
Incentivizing specific behaviors may be more effective than 
attempting to indirectly induce citizenship through homeownership.207  
202. See Follain & Melamed, supra note 197, at 194 tbl.7, 195 (describing how 
portfolio reshuffling lessens both individual impact of and national savings from reducing 
mortgage interest deduction); Glaeser & Shapiro, supra note 16, at 43 (concluding 
“homeownership depends to a considerable degree on taste for structure”).   
203. See Ron Lieber, In Defense of Homeownership, N.Y. Times, Aug. 28, 2010, at B1 
(noting that, compared to renters, homeowners benefit from forced savings inherent to 
many residential mortgage products). 
204. See Dickerson, supra note 1, at 196–97 (describing loan products that enabled 
consumers to provide minimal or no down payment and to extract home equity to pay 
down consumer debt, make home improvements, or for other purchases).   
205. Edward L. Glaeser & Bruce Sacerdote, Why Is There More Crime in Cities?, 107 J. 
Pol. Econ. S225, S228 (1999) (“In the cross-city UCR data, the most important variable is the 
percentage of female-headed households in the city.”).  Other studies have found that 
homeownership maintains a significant relationship to crime, but loses some of its 
explanatory power when community-level variables are included in regressions.  Richard D. 
Alba et al., Living with Crime:  The Implications of Racial/Ethnic Differences in Suburban 
Location, 73 Soc. Forces 395, 417–25 (1994) (concluding homeownership predicts crime 
levels in individual communities, but cannot explain why various groups, in particular 
blacks, suffer differing exposure to crime). 
206. Robert D. Dietz & Donald R. Haurin, The Social and Private Micro-Level 
Consequences of Homeownership, 54 J. of Urb. Econ. 401, 430 (2003).  
207. Directly subsidizing positive externalities also has the advantage of “diversifying” 
social strategy to attenuate, to a degree, the community impacts of housing downturns.  Of 
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Economist Harvey Rosen observes that federal housing subsidies are 
inefficient because they attach bluntly to ownership rather than to 
externality-producing behaviors or social benefits.208  In part because the 
national (and legal) discussion has not particularized the effect of 
homeownership to individual civic behaviors, there has been limited 
attention to the project of targeting subsidies.   
The empirical research points to an array of “ownership virtues” that 
can be produced via direct subsidy or nonmonetary incentives rather than 
exclusively through ownership subsidy.  To counteract low or declining 
homeownership rates, for example, subsidies and interventions can target 
the primary benefits of homeownership—voting, private upkeep, and 
certain kinds of local amenity investment.  In this vein, Ed Glaeser notes 
that one of the strongest benefits of homeownership is gardening and that 
directly funding community “beautification” could produce that benefit 
absent a subsidy to homeownership.209  Alternatively, tax deductions or 
other tax benefits for maintenance or value-enhancing modifications, 
either instead of, or in addition to, the home mortgage interest deduction 
may increase upkeep (and property values).  Subsidies and other 
initiatives can also target social-capital enhancing behaviors and other 
actions that homeownership, or at least short-term homeownership, fails 
to produce, such as participation in community organizations.  Another 
variant of the targeting approach is to apply subsidies narrowly to 
populations likely to capture the benefits of homeownership or produce 
desired externalities.210 
In addition to monetary subsidies, targeted initiatives, community 
group and nonprofit involvement, political mechanisms, and public 
awareness campaigns can also produce specific local civic behaviors.  For 
example, increasing the density of local nonprofit and advocacy groups 
can ameliorate local social capital loss from diminished 
course, this would not remedy all of the negative effects of foreclosure clusters and 
downward spirals in local property values.  But, smaller subsidies would encourage more 
modest and thus less risky amounts of housing consumption.   
208. See Rosen, supra note 15, at 378 (“It is pretty certain that the federal subsidies for 
owner-occupied housing, which in effect lower the cost of housing in general, are 
inefficient.”).   
209. DiPasquale & Glaeser, supra note 5, at 362 tbl.1, 365 (finding strong correlation 
between homeownership and gardening and suggesting it represents investment in local 
amenity). 
210. For example, Don Haurin has suggested targeting subsidies at renter households 
with young children in order to produce better behavioral and cognitive child outcomes.  
Donald R. Haurin et al., Does Homeownership Affect Child Outcomes?, 30 Real Est. Econ. 
635, 660 (2002).  Targeting should not be employed, however, to discriminatorily target 
middle-income and predominantly white homebuyers based on evidence that they 
contribute more to local public goods and social capital—but, arguably, that is precisely 
what current tax subsidies do. 
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homeownership.211 Targeted incentives can be combined to address 
multiple barriers to behavior change: To the extent multiple motivations 
and forces affect local civic behavior, problems may require tailored 
approaches layering legal or structural changes, monetary subsidy (or lack 
of subsidy), and education.212  Local voting and political participation offer 
an example.  Adaptive political mechanisms, such as voter initiatives and 
ward voting, can increase political participation and efficacy in the 
absence of homevoter dynamics.213  Streamlining voter registration may 
increase voting by nonowners who have higher transaction costs 
associated with voting because they move more frequently.214  Increasing 
public awareness that residency requirements for voting are generally 
thirty days or less may also increase tenant voting.215  It may be that a 
portion of the renter-tenant disparity is due to tenants inaccurately 
believing that only resident-owners may vote or that lengthy residency 
requirements prevent them from voting.  To the extent cultural 
sentiments linking ownership to voting are obstacles, social norms 
campaigns, such as those being initiated by the Saguaro Seminar, may 
effectively reframe the importance of all residents participating in local 
politics (and reducing global homeownership subsidies may in itself 
suggest greater social parity and alter tenants’ views of their social 
standing and local voting obligations).216 
211. Robert J. Sampson et al., Civil Society Reconsidered:  The Durable Nature and 
Community Structure of Collective Civic Action, 111 Am. J. Soc. 673, 679–80, 697–98 (2005) 
(finding density of nonprofit organizations increases collective action and social capital). 
212. For example, let us assume the goal is to increase owners and tenant participation 
in voluntary and local organizations.  In combination, greater funding to increase the 
number of non-profits, structural initiatives to increase the convenience of participation 
(such as funding pilot projects for internet or online participation), and greater subsidies for 
personal costs associated with volunteering address different barriers to participation more 
effectively than a global homeownership subsidy.      
213. See Fischel, supra note 4, at 92–94 (describing how laws enabling easy access to 
information about political process, voter initiatives, and ward voting make cities more 
responsive to “resident shareholders”); Kristopher S. Gerardi & Paul S. Willen, Subprime 
Mortgages, Foreclosures, and Urban Neighborhoods 8 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Bos., Public 
Policy Discussion Paper No. 08-6, 2008), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-
rcbg/Events/Papers/Willen,%20Subprime%20Mortgages.pdf (on file with the Columbia 
Law  Review) (describing how negative externalities, particularly in poor, urban 
neighborhoods, arise “during a housing downturn, when clusters of vacant, neglected 
properties develop from widespread foreclosures”).   
214. See Dreier, supra note 80 at 10, 10–11 (discussing barriers to tenant voting and 
proposing reform of complex, burdensome voter registration laws). 
215. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 358–60 (1972) (requiring “durational 
residency requirements . . . to further a compelling state interest”).  In the wake of Dunn v. 
Blumstein, states changed their voting residency requirements to thirty days or less.  See 
Residency Requirements for Voting, available at
http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0781452.html (surveying state laws). 
216. See supra note 181 and accompanying text (discussing Saguaro Seminar). 
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The overriding importance of length of residence to most civic 
behaviors raises the question of whether government should subsidize or 
otherwise incentivize residential stability.  Although typically not 
discussed in these terms, government subsidies for homeownership 
indirectly incentivize residential stability by subsidizing a property form 
that increases the costs of exit.  As scholars have recognized, disincentives 
to exit are problematic because they limit preference-satisfaction, life-
cycle changes, and labor-market mobility.217  There may be countervailing 
concerns that justify the use of exit constraints (e.g., communities in 
extreme distress due to high turnover), but presumably the justification 
should be quite strong to outweigh the costs of distorting mobility choices. 
A more productive path may be to refine proposals for nontraditional 
ownership that grant owner-occupants unilateral control over mobility 
decisions (subject to debt obligations).  In addition, land use regulations 
that facilitate building alterations due to changing life cycle needs, 
cohousing, and renting out rooms and other cost-savings measures may 
increase the ability of occupants to exercise preferences for stability.218    
The political barriers to decreasing global homeownership subsidies 
and directing greater funding to targeted incentives are substantial, but 
not insurmountable.  Tax reforms, such as income phaseouts for 
deductions and the Alternative Minimum Tax, have been circumspectly 
eroding the value of homeownership deductions for middle- and upper-
income taxpayers for several years.219  And now the housing crisis has 
created an unusual political moment where citizens, government, 
advocacy groups, and scholars are reevaluating homeownership’s 
privileged position with greater openness toward reform.220   
217. See, e.g., Fennell & Roin, supra note 8, at 164–65 (describing housing distortions 
from rent control). 
218. Land use regulations that limit building alterations, handicapped accessibility, co-
habitation, or renting out rooms may make it difficult even for owners to age in place; 
removing or limiting these restrictions enables people to exercise preferences for 
residential stability. 
219. See Internal Revenue Serv., Topic 556—Alternative Minimum Tax, at 
http://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc556.html (on file with the Columbia  Law  Review) (last 
updated Mar. 15, 2011) (explaining how Alternative Minimum Tax “attempts to ensure that 
anyone who benefits” from deductions and credits nonetheless “pays at least a minimum 
amount of tax”).   
220. For a discussion of the recent mortgage meltdown as a “property moment” 
enabling reevaluation of property norms, see Nestor M. Davidson & Rashmi Dyal-Chand, 
Property in Crisis, 78 Fordham L. Rev. 1607, 1636–59 (2010) (reconsidering property rights 
through prism of foreclosure crisis).  
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C.  Envisioning a World with Less (Traditional) Homeownership:  
Alternatives to Ownership and Nontraditional Ownership Forms 
Recently, there has been increasing scholarly attention to alternatives 
to ownership and nontraditional ownership forms.221  Yet the vision of 
homeownership’s social benefits, coupled with generous subsidies, has 
made the development of alternative tenure forms, risk-sharing 
arrangements, and more sophisticated long-term renting a distant 
political priority.  The concern, expressed in both academic and political 
commentary, is that ownership forms that lessen investment stake or only 
partially confer the social status of homeowner will reduce local civic 
participation and contribution.222  
Nontraditional forms of ownership include shared equity mortgages 
that enable coinvestment and equity financing,223 land trusts that grant 
the owner title to the residence but retain title to the land and limit profit 
on resale,224 limited equity cooperatives that enable owners to buy shares 
in what is typically a nonprofit housing corporation and impose 
limitations on resale profit,225 and proposed ownership forms that 
separate occupancy and investment interests.226  There have also been 
pilot experiments that offer public insurance against housing price 
decline.227  With respect to alternatives to homeownership, the major 
221. See, e.g., Andrew Caplin et al., Fannie Mae Found., Shared-Equity Mortgages, 
Housing Affordability, and Homeownership 17–22 (2007), available at 
http://cess.nyu.edu/caplin/SEM2007.pdf [hereinafter Caplin et al., Shared-Equity 
Mortgages] (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing shared equity mortgages); 
Fennell, Unbounded Home, supra note 136, at 197–205 (proposing new homeownership 
form that separates possession and occupancy from investment risk); J. Peter Byrne & 
Michael Diamond, Affordable Housing, Land Tenure, and Urban Policy:  The Matrix 
Revealed, 34 Fordham Urb. L.J. 527, 548–49 (2007) (discussing limited equity cooperative). 
222. See, e.g., Fennell, Unbounded Home, supra note 136, at 178–95 (addressing these 
concerns with respect to author’s proposed form of homeownership separating investment 
risk from possessory and consumption rights); Fischel, supra note 4, at 4–18 (hypothesizing 
homeowners drive efficient and socially beneficial provision of amenities at local suburban 
level); Vale, supra note 3, at 17–25 (reviewing commentary describing social pitfalls of 
tenancy). 
223. See Caplin et al., Shared-Equity Mortgages, supra note 221, at 5 (considering role 
of shared equity mortgages in achieving affordable housing goals).   
224. See Jennifer Cohoon McStotts, Dwelling Together:  Using Cooperative Housing to 
Abate the Affordable Housing Shortage in Canada and the United States, 32 Ga. J. Int’l & 
Comp. L. 131, 149 (2004) (noting land trust initiatives are public initiatives similar to 
nonstandard mortgage products in private sector that blur line between owning and 
renting). 
225. See Byrne & Diamond, supra note 221, at 548–49 (describing legal structure of 
limited equity cooperative ownership and governance). 
226. See Fennell, Unbounded Home, supra note 136, at 197–205 (proposing 
investment interests keyed to resale as well as carving homeownership into dual interests 
in occupying and improving).   
227. See Andrew Caplin et al., Home Equity Insurance:  A Pilot Project 2–5 (Yale Int’l 
Ctr. for Fin., Working Paper No. 03-12, 2003), available at 
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alternative is renting or variants on renting, such as more sophisticated 
and flexible long-term rental contracts and options arrangements.228  
Long-term contracting is common in commercial real estate and could be 
imported at a lower level of complexity to the residential market, perhaps 
through default forms with certain provisions for renewal options.229 
A close look at not just the effect but also the effect  size of 
homeownership gains (in domains where such gains accrue) weakens 
objections to nontraditional ownership on the basis of civic benefits.  The 
modest and uneven pattern of citizenship effects reported in the research 
indicates that localism and citizenship concerns generally should not 
hamper the evolution of new tenure forms and alternatives to traditional 
ownership.  This is particularly true in light of the availability of direct 
subsidies and legal and institutional substitutes for homeownership 
effects.230   
Alternatives to ownership are unlikely to hinder most local 
citizenship activity unless these forms substantially decrease residential 
stability. Nontraditional ownership forms and alternatives to 
homeownership that increase residential duration relative to typical 
residential leasing capture most of the benefits of homeownership, which 
operate primarily through length of residence or personal traits correlated 
with stability (though if the effect is due entirely to personal traits the 
availability of long-term alternative forms will shift the distribution of 
these personality types across housing forms rather than increase net 
civic contribution).231  For example, Lee Anne Fennell’s proposed tenure 
form separating interests in housing consumption and on-site risk 
(allocated to the resident) from resale risk and off-site risk (allocated to an 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=410141 (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review) (outlining “the process by which the broad idea of house price insurance . . . 
has evolved into a product that is currently available for purchase in the city of Syracuse, 
New York”). 
228. There has been a proposal in the legal literature for modified versions of rent 
control with slightly longer lease options of one to five years.  See Arlo Chase, Rethinking 
the Homeownership Society:  Rental Stability Alternative, 18 J.L. & Pol’y 61, 95–99 (2009) 
(discussing advantages of longer lease terms).  There have also been proposals for options 
contracts for tenants.  See Robert I. Lerman & Signe-Mary McKernan, Urban Inst., Promoting 
Neighborhood Improvement While Protecting Low-Income Families 2 (2007), available at 
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/311457_Promoting_Neighborhood.pdf (on file with 
the Columbia Law Review) (discussing options for tenants based on area rents). 
229. See Stern, Residential Protectionism, supra note 19, at 1129 (discussing 
application of aspects of commercial leases to residential leases in order to provide longer 
terms and renewal options). 
230. See supra Part V.B (discussing options for increasing civic benefits by targeting 
subsidies and legal reforms to specific citizenship behaviors). 
231. See DiPasquale & Glaeser, supra note 5, at 356 (finding in half of their measures 
more than 50% of effect of homeownership operates through length of residence in 
community). 
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investing entity) capitalizes on duration effects.232  The resident-owner, 
unlike a tenant subject to a lease and landlord, elects when to leave, and 
the resident-owner also has the ability to modify housing with life or 
family changes.233  With respect to renting, in their present incarnations 
residential leases typically do not secure long-term tenancies for tenants 
who desire them.  However, greater use of flexible, long-term contracting, 
including options to renew held by the tenant and even build-out 
provisions, has the potential to substantially increase tenant longevity. 
CONCLUSION 
The “citizen virtues” of ownership are cherished tenets of belief.  Yet a 
closer examination of the research reveals a modest, and in many respects 
quite weak, pattern of citizenship effects.  The research findings call into 
question the prevailing theoretical accounts of homeownership’s citizen 
virtues as well as the forceful government promotion of traditional 
homeownership.  The seeming puzzle of disparate ownership effects 
illuminates potential psychological, historical, social, and economic 
influences underlying citizenship behavior.  A particularized, behavior-
specific account of homeownership effects addresses, and dissipates, 
many of the citizenship and localism concerns that have impeded 
proposals for housing policy reform and nontraditional ownership.   
232. See Fennell, Unbounded Home, supra note 136, at 197–205 (describing proposed 
new ownership form). 
233. Id.  
